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ABSTRACT 
Five experiments compared the use of verbal and numeric methods of 
assessing people's uncertainty and investigated the hypothesis that numeric 
measures of uncertainty can prompt people to engage in a deliberate and rule-
based mode of thinking that is atypical for many situations. In Experiments 1 
through 4, participants read scenarios about situations involving uncertainty and 
provided decisions or judgments in reaction to the described situations. In 
Experiment 5, participants encountered gambling situations and their betting 
behaviors were recorded. For each of the five experiments, one group of 
participants provided numeric estimates of uncertainty before providing Judgments, 
decisions, or behaviors (numeric-first group), another group provided verbal 
estimates of uncertainty before providing judgments, decisions, or behaviors 
(verbal-first group), and another group provided no uncertainty estimates before 
providing judgments, decisions, or behaviors (control-group). If numeric measures 
of uncertainty prompt people to engage in an atypically deliberate and rule-based 
form of processing, the responses made in the wake of such processing might be 
affected. Accordingly, it was hypothesized that the judgments, decisions, and 
behaviors of participants in numeric-first groups would differ from those in control 
and verbal-first groups. The experiments did not yield the expected support for the 
prompting hypothesis. Experiments 3 and 4, however, provided initial 
demonstrations of what was named the alternative-outcomes effect. Verbal 
measures of uncertainty revealed that the perceived likelihood of a target outcome 
can be influenced by normatively equivalent manipulations to the distributions of 
alternative outcomes. The possible importance of this alternative-outcomes effect 
is discussed. Also, the influence of base-rate information on people's uncertainty is 
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discussed in conjunction with Experiments 1 and 2, and the effects of perceived 
control on uncertainty is discussed in conjunction with Experiment 5. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a woman named Sarah who recently read a newspaper article about 
a particular illness. The article contained information about symptoms of the 
illness, how one's family history is related to the illness, various statistics about the 
illness's prevalence, and characteristics of people who are at the highest risk for 
suffering the Illness. The article also described medical research about an over-
the-counter vitamin that can significantly reduce one's susceptibility to the illness. 
On Sarah's next trip to the supermarket, she sees the vitamins for sale. At this 
point Sarah must make a decision~to buy or not to buy the vitamins. 
On a daily basis, people make numerous decisions in the face of 
uncertainty. For example, people make decisions to cany an umbrella, to install 
anti-lock brakes, to buy a lottery ticket, to save a back-up of a computer file, to 
wear sunscreen, to buy life insurance, to purchase a pregnancy test, to set a 
second alarm, or to take vitamins. Such decisions are typically made without full 
knowledge of whether it will rain, whether anti-lock breaks will ever help avoid a 
crash, whether one will win the lottery, etc. How do people make such decisions? 
It is commonly assumed that people assess the uncertainty of various outcomes, 
and that people's mental representations of uncertainty are important mediators of 
such decisions. For example. Sarah's decision to buy vitamins is assumed to be 
mediated by her thoughts of uncertainty about whether she will acquire the illness if 
she does not take precautions. Hence, understanding how people make decisions 
under uncertainty is dependent upon an understanding of how people think about 
uncertainty. 
The construct of psychological uncertainty plays a central role in several 
theories of behavior. Theories of health behavior suggest that a person's 
perceived vulnerability to a given health threat will affect his or her health-relevant 
behavior (e.g., Health Belief Model, see Becker, 1974). Theories concerning jurors' 
verdict decisions posit subjective probability notions and thresholds in depicting 
judgments of reasonable doubt (see Dane, 1985). Decision theories assume that 
people's choices among prospects are mediated by assessments of the 
probabilities for various outcomes (e.g., Prospect Theory, see Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). 
Despite the theoretical importance that psychological uncertainty is assumed 
to hold, little work has been conducted to determine the best way of measuring 
people's uncertainty. As with any mediated process, it is critical that psychological 
uncertainty be well measured in order to understand and predict the decisions and 
behaviors being mediated (see Baron & Kenny, 1986). At the present time, there 
seems to be an implicit assumption in much psychological research that the 
consequences of measuring a person's uncertainty one way versus another are 
generally not significant. The predominant method for the measurement of 
psychological uncertainty involves the solicitation of subjective probability 
estimates; people are asked to provide a numeric uncertainty response between 0 
and 1.0 or between 0 and 100%. The presumption is that people's subjective 
probability estimates reflect the mental uncertainty assessments that mediate their 
decisions and behaviors. 
Recent work has suggested, however, that there may be an important 
reason to use alternative measures of uncertainty instead of those that elicit 
numeric probability estimates when trying to assess people's uncertainty 
(WindschitI & Wells, in press). People's responses on verbal measures of 
uncertainty, which included options such as "very likely" and "certain," were found 
to be more predictive of their preferences and behavioral intentions involving 
uncertainty than were responses on numeric measures. WindschitI and Wells 
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argued that the numeric measures of uncertainty prompted attempts to think about 
the uncertainty information in a rational and deliberate manner, whereas the 
thoughts about uncertainty that mediated people's preferences and behavior 
intentions were more experiential and less deliberative. The advantage of verbal 
measures was that they did not prompt attempts to be rational and deliberative; 
therefore, the responses on verbal measures better reflected people's natural 
thoughts about uncertainty. 
A key idea in the above interpretation is that numeric measures of 
uncertainty prompt people to think about uncertainty information more deliberately 
and systematically than they typically would. The dissertation studies described 
here were designed to explore that idea further. If numeric measures of uncertainty 
do, in fact, prompt people to process uncertainty information in an atypical fashion, 
then responses made in the wake of such processing may be different from 
responses that are not made within such a wake. A series of experiments were 
conducted to test whether soliciting estimates of uncertainty would affect people's 
subsequent decisions, judgments, and behaviors involving uncertainty. The 
prediction guiding these experiments was that the solicitation of verbal estimates 
and the solicitation of numeric estimates would affect subsequent responses, but 
that the solicitation of verbal estimates would have a much smaller effect on 
subsequent responses, given the assumption that verbal measures are less likely 
to prompt atypical processing. 
Each of the experiments in this dissertation was also designed to shed light 
on factors affecting people's perceptions of uncertainty. Researchers' heavy 
reliance on numeric measures of uncertainty may have restricted their ability to 
discover and/or assess the influence of various factors on psychological 
uncertainty. For example, consider the influence that alternative outcomes might 
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have on the perceived likelihood of a particular outcome. Imagine a situation in 
which a person has a 4-in-10 chance of winning a television. Does his or her 
feeling of uncertainty differ depending on whether one other person has a 6-in-10 
chance of winning the same television, or whether each of two other people have a 
3-in-10 chance of winning the television? Such questions about psychological 
uncertainty are difficult to address with numeric measures because people attempt 
to give rational and defensible responses on numeric measures (see WindschitI & 
Wells, in press). The dissertation experiments utilized verbal measures of 
uncertainty to address questions about how psychological uncertainty is affected 
by representativeness information, information about alternative outcomes, and 
illusory perceptions of control. 
In the following sections, I review issues regarding the numeric 
conceptualization and measurement of uncertainty. Then, the experiments of 
WindschitI and Wells (in press), which suggest that there are benefits to using 
verbal measures of uncertainty, are described. Finally, the general rationale 
behind the present set of experiments is discussed, and the motivations for 
investigating representativeness, alternative outcomes, and perceived control are 
described in conjunction with individual experiments. 
The Current State of Uncertaintv Measurement and Conceptualization 
There seems to be an implicit assumption in much psychological research 
that the way in which psychological uncertainty is measured is of little 
consequence. Rarely do authors mention their rationale for choosing a Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 ("very unlikely") to 7 ("very likely"), or a percentage scale 
ranging from 0 to 100%, or a line-segment method anchored by "impossible" and 
"certain." In the domain of attitude assessment, social psychologists explicitly 
acknowledge that there can be important consequences for using one type of 
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attitude measure versus another. For example, attitude measures can differ in 
whether they assess cognitive versus affective components of an attitude toward a 
particular object (Millar & Tesser, 1989). Also, research on the response formats of 
survey items indicates that respondents frequency estimates can vary depending 
on the category ranges of response options (Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch, & Strack, 
1985). It is likely that, in the domain of uncertainty measurement, there might also 
be important consequences of what methods of assessment are used. 
A typical method for measuring psychological uncertainty is to solicit 
subjective probability estimates. This method is used in studies from numerous 
areas and concerning a variety of topics including; perceptions of invulnerability 
(e.g., Burger & Burns, 1988), the hindsight bias (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975), jury 
decision making (e.g., Dane, 1985), confidence in self-generated hypotheses (e.g., 
Koehler, 1994), and overconfidence in interpersonal predictions (e.g.. Dunning, 
Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990). Research participants in these studies are asked 
to provide numeric likelihood estimates ranging from 0 toi .0 or 0 to 100%. The 
presumption is that their numeric responses adequately reflect their mental 
representations of uncertainty. As well as using subjective probability measures to 
assess people's uncertainty, psychologists often discuss psychological uncertainty 
using the language of probability and create theories that include explicit roles for 
subjective probability estimates. 
The measurement and conceptualization of psychological uncertainty in 
numeric terms clearly contrasts with simple observations about the way in which 
people freely express their uncertainty. In everyday speech, people rarely express 
their uncertainty in numeric terms. Rather, they rely on a large lexicon of verbal 
expressions. Results from several empirical studies have indicated that people 
prefer to express their uncertainty in verbal terms (e.g., Brun & Teigen, 1988; Erev 
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& Cohen, 1990; Wallsten, Budescu, Zwick, & Kemp, 1993). In a study that involved 
betting on various sporting events, Erev and Cohen (1990) found that although 
87% of participants preferred to receive uncertainty information in numeric terms, 
68% choose to express their own uncertainty in verbal terms. One might expect 
the percentage of participants with a preference for expressing their uncertainty 
verbally to be even higher in settings that do not involve betting-a domain in which 
the odds of winning are customarily given in numbers. 
Numerous explanations have been proposed to account for why people tend 
to use verbal rather than numeric expressions of uncertainty. One claim is that 
people do not wish to represent their uncertainty opinion in a way that appears 
precise (see Wallsten, Budescu, Rapoport, Zwick, & Forsyth, 1986). Other claims 
are that people resist numeric probability expressions in order to avoid having to 
defend their predictions with a specific derivation or to avoid having the quality of 
their prediction judged (see Beyth-Marom, 1982). The thrust of these claims is that 
people have an active reluctance about using numeric expressions. Although it 
might be true that people wish to avoid using numeric estimates, a more 
fundamental explanation for the way in which people freely express uncertainty 
involves the assumption that people's mental representations of uncertainty in most 
everyday situations are not numeric. In light of this explanation, there may be 
significant problems associated with conceptualizing psychological uncertainty in 
terms of subjective probabilities, and it seems that there is good reason to question 
whether the solicitation of numeric expressions of uncertainty is the most 
appropriate method of assessing people's uncertainty. 
Whv Has Psvcholoaical Uncertainty Been Treated Numericallv? 
There are many possible reasons for why researchers have tended to 
conceptualize, discuss, and measure psychological uncertainty in numeric terms. 
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Psychologists may have been influenced by what Gigerenzer (1991) called the 
tools-to-theory heuristic. According to Gigerenzer, tools that are widely accepted 
and used by scientists to evaluate theories can often shape subsequent scientific 
theories. More specifically, scientific tools can be used as metaphors for 
theoretical concepts, and scientists' use and familiarity with the tools promotes a 
general acceptance of the theoretical ideas. As an illustration from outside of 
psychology, Gigerenzer noted that once the mechanical clock became an 
indispensable tool in astronomical research, the deterministic view of the universe 
as a clock, with God as the watchmaker, flourished. According to Gigerenzer, 
cognitive theories of the mind have been heavily influenced by the statistical, 
methodological, and physical tools that are familiar to psychologists. For example, 
Kelly (1967) successfully proposed a theory to describe people's causal attributions 
that was based on an accepted statistical tool (the analysis of variance), and the 
theory of signal detection draws an explicit analogy between the Neyman-Pearson 
technique of hypothesis testing and the processes involved in people's detection 
and discrimination among stimuli (Tanner & Swats, 1954). It seems likely that 
psychologists' conceptions of psychological uncertainty may be influenced by the 
scientific tools with which they are familiar. Specifically, formal numeric systems of 
probability seem to have provided a groundwork for the way in which psychologists 
measure and conceptualize psychological uncertainty. 
Another factor influencing the way in which people's uncertainty is 
conceptualized and measured may be a false consensus bias on the part of 
psychological scientists (Marks & Miller, 1987). Specifically, psychological 
scientists might forget that the way they think about uncertainty might not be typical 
of the way in which most people think about uncertainty. Psychological scientists 
receive far more training in the areas of statistics and formal reasoning than do 
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most people. Graduate training in psychology has been found to have substantial 
effects on people's statistical and methodological reasoning concerning everyday 
problems (see Lehman, Lempert, & Nisbett, 1988, for evidence). Hence, there is 
good reason to suspect that psychological scientists may think about uncertainty 
differently than do most people. For example, some psychological scientists might 
occasionally think about the uncertainty of an everyday problem in numeric terms, 
whereas non-psychologists would think about the uncertainty in non-numeric terms. 
If a psychological scientist is subject to a false consensus bias, he or she might 
then measure and conceptualize psychological uncertainty in a manner appropriate 
for him or her, but not for most people. 
Other reasons why researchers have typically measured uncertainty in 
numeric terms involve the ease with which numeric uncertainty estimates can be 
elicited, analyzed, and compared to objective standards. Unlike some alternative 
response formats (e.g., formats that require participants to compare their 
uncertainty to graphical displays), the O-to-100% response format is readily 
understood by the typical psychological research participant. Numeric responses 
can be easily added, subtracted, and averaged. Transformations or quantifications 
of numeric-response data are not necessary, and thus, the data are immediately 
amenable to standard statistics used by psychological researchers. An especially 
attractive characteristic of subjective probability estimates is the fact that they can 
be compared to probability estimates that are based on normative systems. For 
instance, the objective probability that two flipped coins will both result in "heads" is 
.25. If a person provides a subjective probability estimate of 40% (or .40) instead 
of 25%, then one could say that his or her reported likelihood is overestimated by 
15 percentage points. Hence, the ability to compare subjective and objective 
probability estimates makes it easy to investigate the extent to which people are 
accurate and well calibrated in their use of numeric probability estimates. 
The convenient characteristics of numeric measures of uncertainty, along 
with a false consensus bias, and a tools-to-theory heuristic, may be primary factors 
in determining how researchers have measured and conceptualized psychological 
uncertainty. None of these factors, however, truly bears on the questions of 
whether people's natural representations are numeric and whether people's natural 
representations of uncertainty are best assessed by numeric measures. 
Nevertheless, a proponent of numeric measures of uncertainty might claim that 
there is substantial empirical evidence suggesting that numeric measures of 
uncertainty hold important advantages over verbal measures (e.g., Beyth-Marom, 
1982; Budescu, Weinberg, & Wallsten, 1988; Sutherland et al., 1991). There are, 
in fact, a number of studies that have compared verbal versus numeric expressions 
of uncertainty. The vast majority of these studies focused on the translation of 
verbal expressions to subjective probabilities or on the benefits that numeric 
probability estimates hold for communicating uncertainty. A common finding from 
such studies is that there are notable individual differences in the way in which 
people interpret verbal expressions of uncertainty. For example, the subjective 
probability that is associated with a phrase such as "very unlikely" can differ 
substantially among individuals (see e.g., Beyth-Marom, 1982; Bryant & Norman, 
1980; Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Sutherland et al., 1991). Another common 
finding is that verbal expressions of uncertainty are interpreted differently when 
embedded in different contexts. For example, people might assign a different 
numeric translation to the phrase "good chance" when it is referring to the 
likelihood of a nuclear reactor accident than when it is referring to the likelihood of 
a baseball player getting a hit. 
Such findings might cause a researcher to question the suitability of verbal 
uncertainty measures. An important point to note, however, is that these research 
findings are from studies examining the interpersonal communication of 
uncertainty. These findings are relevant to questions about how a financial 
consultant should communicate his or her predictions to a client, or how a 
meteorologist should describe his or her weather forecast. These findings are less 
relevant to the question of how people's uncertainty can best be measured and 
conceptualized. For example, the fact that the interpretation of verbal uncertainty 
expressions is dependent upon context should have little influence on how a 
researcher interested in predicting health-protective behavior measures people's 
perceived vulnerability to the AIDS virus; the researcher has the ability to control 
for context effects and between-subjects variability. 
Furthermore, many of the studies that have compared verbal and numeric 
communication of uncertainty have used numeric uncertainty estimates as a 
standard to evaluate verbal expressions. For example, based on the observation 
that different people provide different numeric interpretations for the same verbal 
expression, some researchers have argued that there is an unacceptably high level 
of between-subjects variability In the interpretation of verbal expressions (see e.g., 
Beyth-Marom, 1982; Bryant & Norman, 1980; Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; 
Sutherland et al., 1991). This conclusion rests on an a priori assumption that there 
is not a significant degree of variability in people's use of numeric uncertainty 
estimates. Other research has shown that different people provide different verbal 
interpretations for the same numeric probability estimate (Reagan, Mosteller, & 
Youtz, 1989). The point is not that there is an unacceptably high level of between-
subjects variability in the interpretation of numeric probability estimates. The point 
is that an expression like "44%" might evoke different feelings of uncertainty in 
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different people, just as the expression "almost certain" would. Hence, one cannot 
simply use numeric expressions of uncertainty as a standard by which to evaluate 
verbal uncertainty expressions. 
It appears as though the current tendency to assess and conceptualize 
uncertainty in numeric terms is not based on a compelling rationale or on 
compelling empirical evidence. As already suggested, the potential influences of 
the tools-to-theory heuristic, a false consensus bias, and practical conveniences of 
numeric scales have little relevance to the issue of how most people naturally think 
about uncertainty in most situations. Although empirical work comparing verbal 
and numeric expressions of uncertainty may have left some researchers 
unimpressed by verbal systems of uncertainty expression, the relevance of that 
work is within the domain of uncertainty communication, and many of the 
conclusions based on findings in this area can be questioned. 
Verbal Measures Might Assess Uncertaintv Better Than Numeric Measures 
Recent work has provided evidence that verbal measures of uncertainty 
might often be more effective than numeric measures for assessing people's 
uncertainty (WindschitI & Wells, in press). In the experiments of WindschitI and 
Wells (in press), the predictive utility of a verbal measure of uncertainty (containing 
response options such as "impossible" and "quite likely") and a numeric measure of 
uncertainty (containing response options such as "0%" and "75%") were compared. 
In one experiment, participants were given limited information about a set of 
unseen trivia questions. For each question, they were told about the topic and the 
base rate for correct responding. Participants were asked to estimate the 
likelihoods (on either a verbal or numeric measure) of answering the various trivia 
questions correctly, and they rank-ordered the trivia questions to indicate which 
ones they would most want to be asked if they had an opportunity to make money 
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by answering them correctly. Uncertainty responses on the verbal scale were 
significantly more predictive of participants' preferences than were responses on 
the numeric scale. In another experiment, participants read scenarios about 
situations with undetermined outcomes. The participants were then asked about 
their uncertainty regarding possible outcomes and about how they would behave in 
the described situations. Responses on verbal measures of uncertainty were 
significantly more predictive of reported behavior than were responses on numeric 
measures. 
In a different type of experiment, psychological uncertainty was 
manipulated between versions of scenarios read by participants (WindschitI & 
Wells, in press). For example, participants read a scenario about a person named 
Angle, who was drawing for a prize at a charity event. Some participants read that 
Angle was drawing from a box containing 10 tickets, one of which was a winning 
ticket; others read that she was drawing from a box containing 1000 tickets. 100 of 
which were winning tickets. For all of the scenarios, participants provided either 
verbal or numeric uncertainty estimates concerning specified event outcomes. The 
results indicated that verbal uncertainty estimates were more sensitive to the 
various manipulations of psychological uncertainty than were numeric uncertainty 
estimates. 
The results of the experiments conducted by WindschitI and Wells (in press) 
are consistent with the proposition that people's natural representations of 
uncertainty are not numeric and that verbal expressions of uncertainty better 
approximate people's uncertainty than do numeric expressions. In explaining why 
verbal expressions of uncertainty better approximate people's natural 
representations of uncertainty, WindschitI and Wells argued that numeric measures 
of uncertainty can prompt people to think about uncertainty information in a manner 
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that is different from how they typically would. Specifically, it was argued that the 
solicitation of numeric uncertainty estimates causes people to think in a deliberate 
and rule-based manner about uncertainty information. 
The arguments of WindschitI and Wells (in press) are best understood in 
light of a broad distinction, recently described by Sloman (1996), concerning two 
modes of reasoning (see also, Abelson, 1994). Sloman noted the Increasing 
number of theories in social and cognitive psychology that posit two semi-
independent systems of reasoning or information processing, one more deliberate 
and rule-based than the other. Sloman consolidated the dichotomies in these 
theories and discussed one broad distinction between rule-based and associative 
systems of reasoning. Examples of relevant dichotomies Include Langer's (1989) 
mindful/mindless, Epstein's (1990) rational/experiential, Schneider and Shiffrin's 
(1977) controlled/automatic, and Dovidio and Fazio's (1992) 
deliberate/spontaneous. Common to most of these theories is the idea that, for 
many everyday situations, people can process information in ways that are 
relatively automatic, associative, and experiential, but there are instances in which 
people engage in processing that is more deliberate, rule-based, and analytical 
(see e.g., Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, and Huh, 1992). 
An important contention of WindschitI and Wells (in press) was that numeric 
measures of uncertainty, but not verbal measures of uncertainty, prompt people to 
engage in deliberate and rule-based thinking. One reason why numeric measures 
might prompt more deliberate thinking is that they might enhance a person's 
considerations regarding accuracy. People are aware that numeric responses can 
be labeled as correct or incorrect, and there is far less ambiguity in numeric 
responses such as "85%" than In verbal responses such as "quite likely." The idea 
that the motivation to be accurate can prompt deliberate thinking is similar to a key 
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idea contained in the Elaboration Likelihood Model-that motivated people tend to 
be "central" rather than "peripheral" processors of persuasion information (see 
Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Another way in which numeric measures might prompt 
deliberate and rule-based thinking is by priming a person's awareness of the 
applicability of various rules of probability. The likelihood that a person would 
engage rule-based thinking would increase as the priming of formal rules increases 
(regardless of whether he/she is capable of correctly applying those rules). 
The contention that numeric measures prompt deliberate and rule-based 
thinking whereas verbal measures allow for more experiential and associative 
processing does not, in itself, explain why verbal measures can often provide a 
better assessment of the psychological uncertainty mediating people's decisions 
and behaviors. However, given the assumption (mentioned above) that many 
everyday decisions and behaviors are guided by experiential and associative 
processing, it is not surprising to find that verbal uncertainty estimates, relative to 
numeric estimates, can be better predictors of a variety of decisions and behaviors 
under uncertainty. The idea that numeric responses can be less optimal than 
verbal responses (for predicting decisions and behaviors) because they are based 
on deliberate thinking may, at first glance, seem problematic or counter intuitive. 
The casual mechanisms proposed here, however, are similar to those proposed in 
research concerning the effects of self-reflection (prior to attitude reporting) on the 
strength of the relation between reported attitudes and subsequent behavior (see 
e.g., Wilson, 1990; Wilson, Dunn, Bybee, Hyman, & Rotondo, 1984; Wilson, Dunn, 
Kraft, & Lisle, 1989; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). A key finding in this research is 
that self-reflection about one's attitudes can cause a drop in attitude-behavior 
consistency. Wilson and his colleagues have suggested that self-reflection 
prompts people to focus on specific justifications for their attitudes or on specific 
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qualities of an attitude object (see Wilson et al., 1984,1989; Wilson & Schooler, 
1991). These considerations can affect people's attitude reports, even when they 
do not underlie or affect people behaviors. Hence, a drop in the attitude-behavior 
relation can be caused by self-reflection. The prompting hypothesis, like the 
hypothesis of Wilson, suggests that numeric measures of uncertainty can cause 
people's uncertainty responses to be affected by considerations (as part of the 
deliberate and rule-based processing) that do not necessarily underlie people's 
decisions and behaviors. The potential mismatch in thoughts prompted by a 
numeric measure and thoughts naturally prompted by a decision-making situation 
can lead to a weak relation between an uncertainty estimate and decision 
response. 
Testing the Idea that Numeric Measures Prompt Atypical Processing 
Although the arguments of WindschitI and Wells (in press) appear to provide 
a compelling explanation of their results, the idea that numeric measures of 
uncertainty prompt deliberate and rule-based processing remains somewhat 
speculative. There is an alternative, albeit less compelling, explanation for why 
verbal measures might better predict behaviors and decisions under uncertainty. It 
could be argued that the conversion of an internal representation of uncertainty into 
a verbal uncertainty expression involves less "noise" than does its translation into a 
numeric expression. This explanation assumes that the differences in predictive 
accuracy between verbal and numeric expressions is due to the quantity of 
unspecified error in the conversion process. It does not assume that there is a 
qualitative difference in soliciting numeric versus verbal expression of uncertainty. 
The hypothesis that numeric measures prompt deliberate and rule-based 
thinking has implications that are more complex and far-reaching than the 
implications of the conversion-noise hypothesis. The former hypothesis, which I 
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will call the prompting hypothesis, suggests that a person's thoughts about 
uncertainty infomnation might differ depending upon whether he/she was asked to 
provide a verbal or numeric uncertainty estimate. Hence, verbal and numeric 
response estimates might be differentially influenced by various types of 
uncertainty information. There is some evidence from one of the experiments of 
WindschitI and Wells (in press) that is consistent with this idea. In those 
experiments, participants' numeric uncertainty responses regarding unseen trivia 
questions were more highly correlated with provided base-rate information than 
were verbal uncertainty responses. This finding suggests that participants 
providing a numeric response utilized the base-rate information more than did 
participants providing a verbal response. The conversion-noise hypothesis, which 
does not suggest that uncertainty measures affect the processing of uncertainty 
information, cannot account for this type of finding. 
Another implication of the prompting hypothesis, one that was investigated 
in the present experiments, is that soliciting a numeric estimate of uncertainty from 
a person may affect his or her subsequent behaviors, judgments, or decisions. If 
numeric measures do, in fact, prompt a significant change in the way in which 
people process uncertainty information, then responses made in the wake of such 
processing might be affected. In an article focusing on self-generated validity 
effects in survey research, Feldman and Lynch (1988) discussed how the 
measurement of a respondent's beliefs, attitudes, intentions, or behaviors can 
prime his/her attention to subsets of a stimulus field or subsets of his/her prior 
knowledge. This process increases the likelihood or the degree to which the 
primed information will influence responses on subsequent measurement items. 
Feldman and Lynch (1988) also suggested that the measurement of beliefs, 
attitudes, intentions, or behaviors can sometimes prompt conscious control over 
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normally automatic decisions and behaviors. The hypothesis investigated here 
suggests that numeric measures of uncertainty that are encountered prior to 
decisional and behavioral measures often have stronger effects than do verbal 
measures on how people think about, and respond to, Ihe subsequent decisional 
and behavioral measures. 
Consider the opening scenario about Sarah, who read about a particular 
illness and was deciding whether to purchase vitamins that prevent the illness. 
The prompting hypotheses assumes that, under normal circumstances, Sarah's 
decision, like most everyday decisions, would be based on experiential and 
associative processing. However, imagine she were approached by a social 
psychologist and asked to provide a numeric estimate (0%-100%) for her chances 
of getting the illness. The prompting hypothesis suggests that the request made of 
Sarah would lead her to engage in more deliberate and rule-based processing. 
She may then pay more or less attention to various types of information. For 
example, she may spend more time recalling and processing base-rate information 
but less time processing information about famous people who have the illness. 
Sarah's subsequent decision, made after she provided an uncertainty estimate, 
might then be affected by the deliberate and rule-based processing. 
The present experiments were designed to investigate how behaviors, 
judgments, and decisions change as a function of whether people are asked to first 
provide numeric estimates of their uncertainty, verbal estimates of uncertainty, or 
no estimates of uncertainty. In the experiments, participants were exposed to 
scenarios and situations that have undetermined or unknown outcomes. The 
scenarios and situations required participants to make or engage in relatively 
mundane, but consequential, judgments, decisions, and behaviors that were 
assumed to be mediated by the perceived uncertainty of the possible outcomes. 
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Before providing a judgment, decision, or behavior for each scenario or situation, 
some participants were be asked to provide either numeric or verbal estimates of 
their uncertainty regarding the target outcome. Participants in a control group 
provided a judgment, decision, or behavior response without first being prompted 
for an explicit uncertainty estimate. It was assumed that the responses from the 
control group v/ould inform us of how people would naturally make similar everyday 
decisions under uncertainty. The decisions and behaviors of participants in the 
experimental groups could then be compared to those of the control group to 
access the degree to which the solicitation of verbal and numeric uncertainty 
estimates cause people to deviate from their typical thoughts about uncertainty 
(i.e., the thoughts that would typically mediate their everyday decisions, judgments, 
and behaviors). 
The decisions, judgments, and behaviors of participants first providing 
numeric uncertainty estimates were expected to differ substantially from those in 
the control group. Such a result would constitute support for the idea that numeric 
measures of uncertainty prompt a fomri of information processing that is atypical 
(more deliberate and rule-based) for the scenarios and situations used in the 
experiments. It also seemed possible that the decisions, judgments, and behaviors 
of participants providing verbal uncertainty estimates would differ somewhat from 
the responses of the control group, but to a significantly lesser extent than would 
the responses of people providing numeric estimates. Although the solicitation of a 
verbal uncertainty response might have some impact on people's considerations of 
uncertainty information, it did not seem likely to cause a substantial change in the 
information processing mode (e.g., from an experiential/associative mode to a 
deliberate/rule-based mode). 
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Using Verbal Measures to Investigate Factors Affecting Psychological Uncertainty 
In addition to testing whether numeric measures prompt deliberate and rule-
based thinking, the present experiments were designed to investigate, in a novel 
way, some factors that might influence people's associative or experiential thoughts 
about uncertainty. Researchers' reliance on numeric measures of uncertainty may 
have restricted their investigation of factors that influence the more experiential 
feelings of uncertainty. Numerous factors that affect people's uncertainty may be 
undiscovered, or underresearched, because the numeric measures of uncertainty 
that are often used in investigations of uncertainty are primarily sensitive to the 
more deliberate and rule-based thoughts regarding uncertainty; that is, the effects 
that various factors have on the more experiential feelings of uncertainty may have 
gone largely undetected. In the dissertation experiments, verbal measures of 
uncertainty were used to investigate the extent to which people's experiential 
feelings of uncertainty are influenced by representativeness information 
(Experiments 1 & 2), the distribution of alternative outcomes (Experiments 3 & 4), 
and an illusory perception of control (Experiment 5). These topics, and their 
respective experiments, are described in the following sections. 
20 
THE INFLUENCE OF REPRESENTATIVENESS INFORMATION 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that people's evaluation of the 
probability that object A belongs to class B, or that object A originates from class B, 
is often based on the degree to which object A resembles, or appears 
representative of, class B. When people evaluate probabilities in such a way, they 
are said to be using the representativeness heuristic. The concept of the 
representativeness heuristic describes a quick and often efficient way of making 
judgments of likelihood. Imagine, for example, that you are buying a used car. 
Your judgment about the likelihood that a given car is reliable would probably be 
greatly influenced by the outward appearance of the car. In using the 
representativeness heuristic, you would tend to judge clean, rust-free cars as likely 
to be reliable, because such cars resemble reliable (new) cars more than they 
resemble unreliable (old) cars. This heuristic strategy would, on average, serve 
you well in your judgments about various cars. 
Sometimes, however, use of the representativeness heuristic can be 
problematic. For example, when people base likelihood judgments on 
representativeness, they can be insensitive to issues of sample size, and they often 
display misconceptions of chance (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Most relevant 
for the present experiments is the finding that people sometimes appear to 
underutilize relevant base-rate information when their judgments of probability are 
influenced by representativeness. Consider, for example, the well-known 
lawyer/engineer demonstration (as presented by Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) in 
which research participants were asked to judge the probability that a given 
description was that of an engineer (or lawyer). Participants were told that the 
description was randomly selected from a pool of ICQ descriptions, 70 (30) of which 
described engineers and 30 (70) of which described lawyers. In providing 
probability estimates, participants seemed to base their responses on how 
representative the given description was of a typical engineer (lawyer), and they 
seemed to underutilize base-rate information. 
Since the time that the lawyer/engineer demonstration and related 
demonstrations were first unveiled, numerous studies have been conducted to 
investigate the extent to which base-rate information affects people's judgments of 
likelihood given scenarios such as the lawyer/engineer problem (e.g., Fischhoff & 
Bar-Hillel, 1984; Gigerenzer, Hell, & Blank, 1988; Ginossar & Trope, 1980; Wells & 
Harvey. 1978). These studies are often cited regarding the contentious issue of 
whether representativeness information and other forms of case-specific 
information tend to dominate people's judgments of likelihood, while relevant base-
rate information is ignored or underutilized. The debate regarding this issue has 
not waned (see Koehler, 1996, and that article's accompanying commentaries 
regarding the general issue of base-rate neglect). 
One finding that complicates the issue of base-rate utilization concerns the 
types of judgments that are used as dependent measures in studies like those cited 
above. Base-rate utilization appears to differ as a function of whether the 
dependent measure is worded in probability format or a frequency format (see 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1994; Jones, Jones, & Frisch, 1995). In 
probability formats, participants are simply asked to provide a percent or probability 
that outcome X would occur given Y. In frequency formats, participants are asked 
to indicate how many times X would occur in a number of occasions given Y (e.g.. 
Of 100 people who test positive for the disease, how many actually have the 
disease?). Cosmides and Tooby (1996) and Jones et al. (1995) have found that 
people's frequency judgments tend to be more sensitive to base-rate information 
than are people's probability judgments. Another way of describing these results is 
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to say that the representativeness heuristic may have less influence on frequency 
judgments than on probability judgments. 
Results such as these suggest that the task of determining how people 
utilize base-rate and representativeness information in natural decision making is a 
complex one. Decision researchers use judgments of uncertainty (i.e., probability 
and frequency judgments) in order to learn about the processes that naturally 
mediate decisions made under uncertainty. The findings based on probability 
judgments draw attention to the importance of mediating processes (namely, 
processes that are sensitive to representativeness) that are different from those 
highlighted by the findings based on frequency judgments (which emphasize 
processes that are sensitive to base rates). 
Further complicating the issue is the idea that both probability and frequency 
measures, because they involve the solicitation of numbers, may be problematic as 
a means of measuring the psychological uncertainty that typically mediates 
decisions. If, as argued by Windschitl and Wells (in press), numeric measures of 
uncertainty prompt an atyplcally deliberate and analytical mode of processing, then 
results from studies using probability measures (as well as studies using frequency 
measures) might overestimate the extent to which some decisions tend to be 
influenced by base rates and underestimate the influence of the representativeness 
heuristic. 
Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to test whether numeric measures of 
uncertainty (in a probability format) might sometimes underestimate the influence of 
the representativeness heuristic in decision making. The experiments also tested 
the general thesis that numeric measures of uncertainty can prompt a mode of 
processing that is atypical of the natural decision process. 
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Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, participants read a scenario tliat described a man named 
Edwin, wlio had recently been feeling ill. Edwin's symptoms were described, as 
well as the typical symptoms of two potential illnesses. The symptoms of one 
illness, called AAL, were quite similar or representative of Edwin's, but the base 
rate for the illness was very low (1-in-500,000). The symptoms of the second 
illness, called APh, was less representative of Edwin's, but the base rate for that 
illness was much higher (1-in-500). Participants in a verbal-response-first group 
(henceforth called the verbal-first group) provided verbal estimates of the likelihood 
of Edwin having each illness, and then they made a decision as to whether Edwin 
should receive treatment for AAL or APh. Participants in a numeric-response-first 
group (henceforth call the numeric-first group) provided numeric estimates of 
likelihood and then made their treatment decision. Participants in a control group 
simply made their treatment decision without providing any uncertainty responses. 
As described in the general introduction to these experiments, the 
responses of participants In control groups can inform us about people's typical 
decision processes in the absence of preceding questions about uncertainty. For 
the present experiment, it seemed likely that, consistent with similar research on 
people's use of base-rate information, participants in the control group would be 
somewhat insensitive to base-rate information. Based on this assumption, it was 
expected that participants in the control group would tend to recommend that AAL, 
which is more representative of Edwin's symptoms than is APh, be treated even 
though the base rate for AAL is much smaller than the base rate for APh. It is 
important to note, however, that such a result cannot be taken as evidence of base-
rate neglect, because a decision maker could hold the reasonable assumption that 
the matching of symptoms is more important than the base-rate information. 
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The more critical predictions for this experiment involve the comparison 
between treatment decisions in the control group and those in the verbal-first and 
numeric-first groups. It was expected that the treatment decisions of participants in 
the verbal-first group would not differ from those in the control group, but that 
participants in the numeric-first group would tend to favor treating APh more so 
than would participants in the control and verbal-first groups. Such a result would 
suggest that the need to provide a numeric uncertainty estimate caused 
participants in the numeric-first group to attend to base-rate information more than 
did participants who simply made their decision with no preceding question (control 
group) and those who made their decision after providing a verbal uncertainty 
response. 
Method 
Participants and Design. The participants were 108 Iowa State University 
undergraduate students. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three 
between-subjects conditions-the control, numeric-first, or verbal-first condition. 
The participants for this experiment also served as participants for 
Experiment 5 of the present series. The order in which participants experienced 
the two experiments was counterbalanced. Analyses indicate that the ordering of 
the experiments did not affect the results for either of the experiments; the order-of-
experiments variable did not produce main effects or interact with relevant 
variables. Consequently, the order-of-experiments variable (i.e., the 
counterbalancing) will not be discussed further. 
Materials and Procedure. Experimental sessions were held with two 
participants at a time. Conditions were not nested within groups. All of the 
relevant experimental materials were contained in small questionnaire packets, the 
contents of which differed slightly among the control, numeric-first, and verbal-first 
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groups. When participants were first given the packet, they were given oral, 
introductory directions. As part of those directions, they were instructed to refrain 
from paging forward in the packet, or from changing responses on previous pages. 
All participants saw the following scenario first. 
Edwin Miller is a 54 year old school teacher who is having some health 
problems. He made a trip to his trusted doctor and explained all the aches, 
pains, and problems that he has been experiencing. Edwin complained of a 
bloated feeling in his stomach, excessive gas, increased salivation, a 
decrease in appetite, and frequent urination. He also explained that when 
he eats fruits or foods with a lot of sugar, he gets a sharp pain in his 
stomach. Edwin's doctor explained that Edwin has an unusual duster of 
symptoms. The doctor said that given Edwin's odd reactions to fruits and 
sugar, Edwin must be suffering from one of two conditions, neither of which 
is overly serious. The doctor told Edwin that it is difficult to discriminate 
between the two conditions and that the best course of action is to pick one 
of the conditions to treat first. If that treatment does not lead to 
improvements after a month, then treatments for the other condition can be 
implemented. As typical of Edwin's doctor, he provided Edwin with the 
relevant Information from a medical guide, and asked Edwin to indicate what 
condition he thought he might have and, hence, what treatments he should 
try first. The treatments for the two conditions have the same cost, are 
equally inconvenient, and have the same success rate. The medical guide 
describes the conditions as follows: 
Anterior Abdominal Lanqina f AAU - A classic symptom of AAL is an 
aversive reaction to foods containing high amounts of fructose or other 
sugars. The condition afflicts approximately 1 out of 500,000 adults over 
the age of 50. Other symptoms can include heartburn, bloated 
abdominal sensations, excessive salivation, decrease appetite, and 
excessive gas. 
Abdominal Pharisa (APh) ~ Individuals afflicted with APh often report 
aversive reactions to food containing high amounts of sugar. 
Approximately 1 out of 500 adults between the ages of 45 and 60 will 
suffer from APh. Other symptoms of APh can include heartburn, bloated 
abdominal sensations, excessive salivation, and diarrhea. 
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What the participants read next differed among the three groups. 
Participants in the control condition read the following treatment-decision question 
(printed on the next page of the packet); "Which condition should Edwin try treating 
first?" They indicated their answer by circling either "AAL" or "APh." Participants 
in the numeric-first condition read the following two uncertainty questions (printed 
on the next page of the packet) before encountering the treatment-decision 
question: "How likely is it that Edwin is suffering from AAL?" and "How likely is it 
that Edwin is suffering from APh?" A numeric response scale, identical to the one 
shown in Figure 1, followed each of these two questions. On the next page of the 
packet, participants then read and responded to the treatment-decision question. 
Participants in the verbal-first condition answered the same questions in the same 
order as did the numeric-first participants, but the response scales they saw for the 
uncertainty questions were verbal scales, identical to the one shown in Figure 1. 
Results and Discussion 
The research question of interest in the present experiment is not whether 
one group's responses were more normatively correct than those of another group. 
(In fact, one cannot determine a normatively correct response for the scenario 
questions.) Also, there is little interest or logic in trying to determine whether base-
rate information was more or less powerful than representativeness information. 
Instead, the main question of interest is whether the treatment decisions provided 
by participants differed among the control, verbal-first, and numeric-first groups. 
Contrary to what was predicted, there were no differences between the treatment 
decisions made by participants in the three groups. Within each of the three 
groups, 19 out of 36 participants (52.8%) said that Edwin should first try treating 
APh, the illness that has the higher base rate but fewer representative symptoms. 
27 
certain 
extremely likely 
quite likely 
fairly likely 
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slightly unlikely 
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,quite unlikely 
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30% 
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10% 
0% 
Figure 1. The verbal and numeric measures of uncertainty that were used in 
Experiments 1 -5. 
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This result is surprising in at least two respects. First, the fact that about 
half of the participants within each group recommended treating the high base-rate 
illness suggests that many participants were not neglecting base-rate information. 
There is no apparent information in the scenarios, with the exception of the base 
rates, that should lead a respondent to favor treating APh over AAL. Hence, it 
appears that for many participants in all of the conditions, the base rates had 
enough influence over treatment decision to override the influence of the 
representativeness information, which clearly supported the treatment of the low 
base-rate illness (AAL). Alternative explanations to this account exist, however. 
For example, it is possible that the treatment decisions were not influenced by 
either type of information. Perhaps participants were apathetic in making their 
treatment decisions, resulting in a roughly 50/50 spilt in choice of illness to treat. 
Or perhaps participants assumed that if the doctor decided to leave the decision 
making to Edwin, then the decision, from the doctor's perspective, was a toss-up. 
Other possible explanations assume that components of the descriptions for AAL 
and APh had certain effects on treatment decisions, even though post hoc 
explanations for these effects remain nonapparent; it is important to note that the 
descriptions were not equated in all respects and that characteristics of the 
descriptions were not counterbalanced. Consequently, the surprising fact that over 
half of the participants recommended treatment for the high-base-rate/ 
nonrepresentative illness cannot be fully explained. 
The second respect in which the results for the treatment decisions are 
surprising concerns the main hypothesis driving this experiment. Specifically, it 
was expected that soliciting a numeric estimate of uncertainty would cause 
participants to process the scenario information differently than they normally 
would and that they would think about the information in a more deliberate and 
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rule-based fashion. It was thought that, as a result, the treatment decisions of 
participants in the numeric-first group would be more influenced by the base-rate 
information than would the responses of participants in the control and verbal-first 
groups. The result tally already reported, however, provides no evidence that the 
solicitation of numeric estimates of uncertainty or verbal estimates of uncertainty 
had any effect on how participants made their treatment decisions. 
One possible explanation for the lack of differences in treatment decisions 
across groups is that all participants, regardless of experimental conditions, tended 
to be sensitive to the base-rate information. If all participants were cognizant and 
sensitive to the base-rate information, then any prompting effects (prompting them 
to attend to rule-based Information) experienced by participants in the numeric-first 
group would be redundant and would not have an apparent effect on treatment 
decisions. Perhaps the way in which the base-rate information was presented in 
the scenario itself drew sufficient attention from participants such that it had a 
significant effect on the responses of participants in the control condition, as well 
as the numeric- and verbal-first conditions. One quality of the scenario that might 
have been problematic is the complexity of the representativeness information. 
Utilizing the representativeness information required a respondent to do two sets of 
careful comparisons-between Edwin's symptoms and the typical symptoms of the 
two diseases. This task was likely made difficult by the length of the scenario, the 
presence of irrelevant information, and the non-list format for the display of the 
symptoms. Hence, these characteristics of the scenario may have made the 
numeric base rates a relatively salient and easy-to-use form of information. 
Along with the treatment-decision question, the other dependent measures 
of interest were the uncertainty questions asked of participants in the numeric-first 
and verbal-first conditions. As noted earlier, recent evidence suggests that 
utilization of base-rate information might be heightened when a frequentist format 
(How many times out of 100 would...?) is used to question people about their 
uncertainty versus when a probabilistic format is used (What is the numeric 
probability that...?) (see Cosmides &Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1991, 1994). The 
present experiment tested whether a probabilistic format using numeric response 
options might lead to a higher utilization of base-rate information than does a 
verbal-response format. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the more participants' uncertainty 
responses were affected by the base-rate information, the higher their likelihood 
estimates for APh (the high-prevalence illness) would be and the lower their 
likelihood estimates for ML (the low-prevalence illness) would be. The likelihood 
estimates for both numeric measures and verbal measures were scored from 0 to 
10. For participants providing numeric responses, the mean likelihood estimates 
were 4.53 (SD=2.6) for the APh illness and 3.86 (SD=2.9) for the AAL illness. For 
participants providing verbal responses, the respective means were 6.44 (SD=1.8) 
and 5.77 (SD=2.3). The appendix contains a table for these means (as well as 
several tables for mean responses from Experiments 2, 3, and 4). The likelihood 
estimates were submitted to a multivariate analysis of variance with estimate-type 
(i.e., numeric versus verbal)"^ as the between-subjects independent variable. The 
main effect for estimate type was significant, F(1,70)=24.79. MSE=5.33. b<.001 . 
This is consistent with findings from previous research in which responses on the 
type of verbal scale used in this experiment tend to show a main-effect upward shift 
relative to responses on the type of numeric scale used here (see WindschitI & 
Wells, in press, for discussion). Although the means for both the verbal and 
numeric estimates concerning the AAL illness were directionally higher than those 
concerning the APh illness, the illness-type main effect did not reach significance, 
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F(1,70)=2.59, MSE=6.19. o=.11. Most importantly, the Interaction between the 
estimate-type and Illness-type variables was not significant. F<1. Hence, there is 
no evidence that numeric measures of uncertainty prompted people to utilize base-
rate information more than did verbal measures of uncertainty. 
Another question that can be asked regarding the uncertainty estimates is 
whether verba! estimates better predicted treatment decisions than did numeric 
estimates. In studies conducted by WindschitI and Wells (in press), verbal 
estimates were found to be better predictors of people's preferences and behavior 
intentions. For the present experiment, a difference score was computed for each 
participant by subtracting his or her scored response on the AAL uncertainty 
question from his or her response on the APh uncertainty question. Thus, the 
greater a participant's difference score, the more a participant suspected the high 
base-rate Illness (APh) over the low base-rate illness as the cause of Edwin's 
suffering. Point-biserial correlations were computed for relations between these 
difference scores and participants' selection of the high-base rate illness (APh) to 
treat. Not surprisingly, the correlations were high and significantly different from 
zero for participants in the numeric-first condition, r=.61, and for participants in the 
verbal-first condition, r=.73. Although the coefficient for the verbal-first group is 
directional ly larger than that of the numeric-first group, the difference in the 
magnitudes of the two coefficients is not statistically significant, 2=0.97, 2=.33.2 
Experiment 2 
Like Experiment 1, Experiment 2 examined the extent to which numeric 
measures of uncertainty (using a probability format) might inaccurately reflect the 
roles of representativeness and base-rate information In determining people's 
feelings of likelihood. Unlike in Experiment 1, however, the feelings of likelihood 
being studied in Experiment 2 had some personal significance to the respondent. 
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Specifically, the uncertainty measures and dependent measures of interest in 
Experiment 2 assessed (or were closely tied to) people's perceptions of 
vulnerability for a described health condition. Also unlike Experiment 1, 
Experiment 2 included a manipulation of representativeness information. 
Participants in Experiment 2 read an informational paragraph about a 
supposed enzyme called TES. TES was described as a natural enzyme that is 
present in 4 of every 13 Americans. The paragraph Indicated that although TES 
itself is harmless, it is associated with enhanced risks for specified health 
problems. At the end of the paragraph, a number of people were listed as having 
the TES enzyme. The people on this list were manipulated between two 
conditions. Participants in a high-representativeness condition saw names of 
famous people who were similar to participants on an age dimension and whose 
images participants might have wanted to emulate. Participants in a low-
representativeness condition read names of people who greatly differed from 
participants on an age dimension and whose images participants might have been 
less likely to want to emulate. Analogous to the procedures in Experiment 1, 
participants in the verbal-first and numeric-first conditions provided responses on 
verbal/numeric measures of perceived vulnerability (i.e., a measure concerning the 
likelihood of having TES). and then provided responses to two judgment questions 
(concerning potential surprise and interest in being checked for TES). Participants 
in a control condition provided responses on the surprise and interest questions 
before seeing any uncertainty questions. 
The general prediction driving this experiment, like the ideas motivating all 
of the dissertation experiments, was that numeric measures of uncertainty would 
prompt people to process the presented uncertainty information in a more analytic 
and rule-based fashion than they normally would, had they not been asked to 
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provide a numeric estimate of their uncertainty. Hence, it was expected that 
responses of participants in the numeric-first group would be heavily influenced by 
the numeric base-rate information presented in the scenario, whereas the 
responses of participants in the verbal-first and control condition would be more 
influenced by the representativeness information included in the scenario (i.e., by 
how similar they feel to the people listed in the scenario). In terms of specific 
predictions for the results of this experiment, it was thought that the uncertainty 
responses and judgment responses of participants in the numeric-first group would 
show no differences between the high and low representativeness conditions, 
whereas the responses in the control and verbal-first groups would show significant 
differences between the two representativeness conditions. 
Method 
Participants and Design. The participants were 288 Iowa State University 
undergraduate students. Data from two participants, who indicated the enzyme 
scenario resembled a scenario that they encountered in a different psychology 
experiment, were excluded from the analyses conducted for this experiment. The 
design was a 2 (Low/High-Representativeness) x 3 (Control/Numeric-first/Verbal-
first) between-subjects factorial. 
The participants for this experiment also served as participants for 
Experiments 3 and 4 of the present series. The order in which participants 
experienced the three experiments was counterbalanced, and the assignment of 
participants into the low/high-representativeness conditions was independent of 
what conditions participants were assigned to for Experiments 3 and 4. However, 
the assignments of participants to the control, verbal-first, and numeric-first 
conditions were yoked for each of the three experiments. For example, a 
participant who served in the control condition for Experiment 2, also served in the 
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control conditions for Experiments 3 and 4. Analyses indicate that the ordering of 
the experiments did not affect the results for any of the experiments; the order-of-
experiments variable did not produce systematic main effects or interact with 
relevant variables. Consequently, the order-of-experiments variable (i.e., the 
counterbalancing) will not be discussed further. 
Materials and Procedure. Experimental sessions were held with small 
groups of participants (2-8 people). All relevant experimental materials were 
contained in a packet. The contents of the packet differed slightly among the 
control, numeric-first, and verbal-first groups. When participants were first given 
the packet, they were given oral, introductory directions. As part of those 
directions, they were instructed to refrain from paging forward in the packet and 
from changing responses on previous pages. All participants saw the scenario 
first, which is printed below. Within brackets appear the wording for low- and high-
representativeness conditions respectively. 
About 4 of every 13 Americans are born with an enzyme called the Tarctic 
Endocrine Stimulant (TES) in their bloodstream. The TES enzyme itself is 
harmless and non-transmittable. It is a naturally occurring substance 
produced by the body. The enzyme is, however, associated with an 
increased risk of certain health problems. For example, relative to people 
who do not have the TES enzyme, those who do have the enzyme have a 
significantly greater risk for heart disease, skin cancer, and diabetes. 
Determining whether a person has the enzyme can be done with a simple 
saliva test. The enzyme is most common in Europeans and Americans 
whose ancestors are of European descent. [Barbara Bush, Sally Jesse 
Raphael, Hugh Downs, and Henry Kissinger / Courtney Cox, Wynona Ryder, 
Andre Agassi, and Brad Pitt] have the TES enzyme. 
What the participants read next differed among the three groups. 
Participants in the control condition were asked on the next page of the packet: 
"How surprised would you be if you found out that you had the TES enzyme?" (not 
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surprised at all, barely surprised, somewhat surprised, pretty surprised, very 
surprised, extremely surprised). They then read: "A quick test can tell people 
whether they have the TES enzyme and whether they might have an increased risk 
for certain health conditions. Simple steps can then be taken to help prevent those 
conditions. If the Student Health Center were to offer the TES saliva tests, would 
you be interested in being checked?" (not interested at all, barely interested, 
somewhat interested, pretty interested, very interested, extremely interested). 
Participants in the numeric-first condition first read an uncertainty question: "How 
likely do you think it is that you have the TES enzyme?" A numeric response scale, 
identical to the one shown in Figure 1, followed the question. On the next page of 
the packet, participants then read and responded to the surprise and Interest 
questions. Participants in the verbal-first condition answered the same questions 
in the same order as did the numeric-first participants, but the response scale they 
saw for the uncertainty question was a verbal scale. 
Results and Discussion 
Recall that the specific predictions for the results were that the uncertainty 
responses and judgment responses of participants in the numeric-first group would 
show no differences between the high and low representativeness conditions, 
whereas the responses in the control and verbal-first groups would show significant 
differences between the two representativeness conditions. Contrary to these 
predictions, the representativeness manipulation had similar effects on the 
responses of participants in all groups. Responses for the uncertainty questions 
were scored as they were for Experiment 1, and responses on the surprise and 
interest questions were scored from 1 (not at all) to 6 (extremely). An analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) for the uncertainty responses revealed a main effect for the 
representativeness information such that participants in the high-
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representativeness groups reported higher lil<elihoods of having the TES enzyme 
(M=4,04, SD=2.4) than did participants in the low-representativeness groups 
(M=3.34, SD=2.1). F(1,186)=4.85, MSE=4.85. e<.05. d=0.31. Surprisingly, the 
effect was not moderated by an interaction with the estimate-type variable, 
F(1,186)<1. Consistent with results from Experiment 1 and other experiments 
utilizing numeric and verbal response scales such as these, the responses on the 
verbal scale (M=4.12, SD=2.2) showed a main-effect upward shift relative to 
responses on the numeric scale (M=3.27, SD=2.3), F{1,180)=7.06, 2< 01. 
An ANOVA for the responses on the interest question revealed no significant 
main effects nor a significant interaction effect; the mean responses for the low and 
high representativeness conditions were 3.62 (SD=1.3) and 3.48 (SD=1.3), 
respectively. However, an analysis of the responses on the surprise question 
revealed a nearly significant main effect for the representativeness information 
such that participants in the high-representativeness groups reported less expected 
surprise if they were found to have the TES enzyme (M=3.58, SD=1.3) than did 
participants in the low-representativeness groups (M=3.85, SD=1.1). 
F(1,280)=3.49, MSE=1.50, e=.06, d=0.23. Unexpectedly, this effect was not 
moderated by an interaction with the estimate-type variable, F(2,280)=1.39, e=.25. 
The main effect for differences in surprise responses among the participants in 
numeric-first, verbal-first, and control groups was nearly significant, F(2,280)=2.57, 
0=.08.3 
Clearly these results do not provide the expected evidence that numeric 
measures of uncertainty would prompt a form of analytic and rule-based 
processing. There were no differences in the way in which participants responded 
to the surprise and interest questions when they first provided a numeric estimate 
of uncertainty, a verbal estimate of uncertainty, or no estimate of uncertainty. The 
overall pattern of results for the surprise and interest questions (across the 
numeric-first, verbal-first, and control conditions) suggests that people's judgments 
were only somewhat sensitive to the representativeness information presented in 
the scenarios. It is important to point out, however, that the representativeness 
manipulation had a reliable effect on participants' uncertainty estimates, regardless 
of the form of their estimates. This precludes the conclusion that the 
representativeness of the famous names presented in the scenarios had no effect 
on participants or that the manipulation was ineffective. 
Analyses on additional questions seen by participants at the end of the 
questionnaire packet indicated that the names comprising the representativeness 
manipulation did indeed differ in their perceived similarity to the participants and in 
their perceived favorability. The following items were included at the end of the 
questionnaire packet as manipulation checks: "Please rate how similar these 
people are to you" and "How favorably do you view these people?" Below each of 
these items were the eight names used in the representativeness manipulation (the 
four from the high-representativeness condition and the four from the low-
representativeness condition) and rating scales ranging from 1 ("not similar at 
aH"/"not favorably at all") to 10 ("very similar"/"very favorably") for each name.4 
The four names used for the high-representativeness condition elicited a mean 
similarity response of 3.91 (SD=1.9) and a mean favorability response of 6.30 
(SD=2.1). whereas the name used for the low-representativeness condition elicited 
similarity and favorability responses of 2.50 (SD=1.5) and 4.2 (SD=1.9), 
respectively. The ratings for the names used in the high and low 
representativeness conditions were significantly different on both the similarity and 
favorability dimensions, t(282)=13.43, d=0.82,2< 001 and t(282)=16.30, d=1.05, 
2<.001, respectively. 
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Given that the names used in the two representativeness conditions did 
differ substantially in perceived similarity and favorability, and that the 
representativeness manipulation affected participants uncertainty responses, it is 
surprising that the names did not have more of an impact on participants' surprise 
and interest judgments. It is possible that participants' responses on the surprise 
and interest questions were affected by factors other than their own perceived 
vulnerability to having the enzyme. Perhaps, for example, participants who read 
about "cool" television stars and athletes (i.e., the participants in the high-
representativeness condition) felt that having the enzyme would not be such a bad 
thing, and this sentiment had unexpected effects on such participants' interests in 
finding out whether they had the enzyme. Or perhaps the enzyme was perceived 
as more severe or negative in the low-representativeness condition, and the 
perceived severity had unforeseen effects on the surprise and interest judgments. 
The results of correlational analyses revealed that the relations between the 
uncertainty responses and the interest judgments were quite weak; the Spearman 
correlations for the numeric and verbal conditions were .16 and .14, respectively. 
The weak relations suggest that perceptions of uncertainty were not driving 
participants' interest judgments. The relations between uncertainty responses and 
the surprise judgments were stronger (-.56 for numeric and -.47 for verbal), but 
moderate enough to speculate about factors, other than uncertainty, that might 
have been driving surprise judgments. Also, a weak correlation between interest 
and surprise judgments (-.07 for the total sample) suggests that different factors 
may have been influencing the judgments themselves. 
Conclusions about the Influence of Representativeness Information 
Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to test the idea that numeric measures 
of uncertainty might underestimate the influence of representativeness information, 
especially when base-rate information is also available, in determining people's 
uncertainty. As already mentioned, previous research had shown that the type of 
numeric format in which uncertainty is assessed can yield different conclusions 
about the degree to which people utilize base-rate and representativeness 
information (see e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1991,1994). For the 
present experiments, it was thought that any numeric format might overestimate the 
influence of base-rate information and underestimate the influence of 
representativeness information in detennining people's uncertainty. Neither 
Experiment 1 nor Experiment 2 yielded evidence supporting the hypothesis. A 
main component of such evidence would have involved differences in judgment 
responses between the control condition and numeric-first condition; such 
differences were not observed. Also, the responses of participants in the verbal-
first conditions showed no differences from those of participants in the numeric-first 
conditions. 
Despite the lack of supporting evidence for the present hypothesis, it seems 
premature to conclude that numeric measures do a fine job of assessing the role of 
the representativeness heuristic in judging the likelihood and the influence of base-
rate information. Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, studies by WindschitI and Wells (in 
press) demonstrated that numeric and verbal measures of uncertainty can show 
differential sensitivity to various forms of uncertainty information, and that verbal 
measures can be more predictive of some judgments and decisions. Perhaps there 
are important circumstances, different from those constructed in the present 
experiments, in which numeric and verbal measures would prove to be differentially 
sensitive to representativeness and base-rate information. One characteristic of 
the presentation of uncertainty information in the present experiments that might 
have worked against finding verbal and numeric differences was the manner in 
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which the base-rate information was conveyed. Specifically, a frequency format 
was used to communicate the base rates in the present studies. As recently 
demonstrated by Cosmides and Tooby (1996), presenting base rates as 
frequencies rather than probabilities can, in itself, produce an enhanced sensitivity 
to that information. If the frequentist presentation of base rates in the present 
experiments enhanced participants' sensitivity to the base-rate information, it would 
not be surprising that responses in the control and verbal-first conditions 
resembled those from the numeric-first conditions. Clearly, however, there are 
many real-world situations in which base-rate information is not presented in a 
frequency format. It may be the case that for these situations, numeric measures of 
uncertainty overestimate people's use of base rates and underestimate people's 
use of the representativeness heuristic in thinking about uncertainty and making 
decisions under uncertainty. 
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THE INFLUENCE OF ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES 
People's judgments and decisions are often affected by information that is 
normatively irrelevant. Consider, as example instances, the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic, the gambler's fallacy, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. 
Demonstrations of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic show that when people 
are given an initial "anchor" value and are told to adjust that value until it reflects 
their best estimate of an unknown target value (e.g., the percent of United Nation 
countries that are African), people's final estimates tend to be insufficiently 
adjusted from the "anchor" value, even when the anchor value has no diagnostic 
value (see e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Demonstrations of the gambler's 
fallacy indicate that people often use prior outcomes of a random process to guide 
their predictions of a specific outcome, even though the outcome is not contingent 
on the prior outcomes. And, demonstrations of the ratio-bias phenomenon show 
that people's feelings of uncertainty regarding an event are influenced by the 
magnitude of the numbers used to describe the odds for the event, even when the 
odds ratios, and hence the objective probabilities, remain equivalent (e.g., 1-in-10 
versus 10-in-100; see Denes-Raj, Epstein, & Cole, 1995; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 
1992; Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1989; WindschitI & Wells, in press). 
Experiments 3 and 4 of the present dissertation were designed to investigate 
an additional instance in which people's judgments and decisions might be affected 
by information that is normatively irrelevant. Specifically, the experiments 
investigated whether, and the extent to which, the perceived likelihood of a target 
outcome is affected by normatively equivalent variations in the distribution of 
alternative outcomes. Imagine, for example, that there is 1 winning ticket out of the 
100 tickets distributed among you and your 9 friends. You hold 10 tickets. Would 
you feel better about your chances of winning if you learned that each of your 9 
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friends holds 10 tickets, or if you learned that 1 of your friends holds 82 tickets and 
each of your 8 other friends holds 1 ticket? It seems quite possible that the 
distribution of alternative outcomes could have a substantial effect on the 
psychological uncertainty associated with a given outcome. 
For present purposes, I will refer to this potential effect as the alternative-
outcomes effect. A search of the judgment and decision-making literature suggests 
that no research has been conducted on the alternative-outcomes effect. One 
possible reason for a lack of research concerns the problems associated with using 
numeric measures of uncertainty to detect an alternative-outcomes effect. It is 
difficult to describe two normatively equivalent distributions of alternative outcomes 
without also providing a discernible objective probability for the target outcome. In 
the above scenario, for example, the objective odds of you winning are 10-in-100. 
When participants are asked to provide a numeric uncertainty estimate, they tend 
to think in a more rule-based fashion, calculate the objective probability, and base 
their ultimate responses on their calculations rather than their experiential feelings 
of likelihood. Hence, results gained from numeric measures of uncertainty would 
almost always suggest that there is no alternative-outcomes effect. 
There are other types of dependent measures that might provide a better 
means of testing for an alternative-outcomes effect. Behavioral measures or 
decision measures would not prompt atypical thinking, and responses on such 
measures would not be directly mapped from objective probability levels. These 
qualities of behavior and decision measures were useful in discovering and 
researching the gambler's fallacy and the ratio-bias phenomenon. The liability of 
these measures, however, is that they are inconvenient for the researcher and are 
indirect measures of people's uncertainty. 
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Experiments 3 and 4 utilized verbal measures of uncertainty to provide a test 
for the alternative-outcomes effect. It was thought that participants who provide a 
verbal uncertainty estimate would not be prompted to think in an atypically analytic 
and rule-based mode, and their responses might be influenced by more than just 
the normatively relevant information. Results from a short scenario used by 
Windschiti & Wells (in press) suggested that verbal measures of uncertainty might 
be sensitive to an alternative-outcomes effect. One version of the scenario 
described a cleaner named Randy, who had cleaned 30 classrooms in a previous 
week, while the remaining 20 classrooms were cleaned by Sylvia. The second 
version of the scenario indicated that Randy cleaned 30, while Amy cleaned 7, 
Laura cleaned 5, Matt cleaned 5, and Sylvia cleaned 3. Participants were asked 
how likely it was that a particular classroom was cleaned by Randy. Participants 
providing numeric responses showed no alternative-outcomes effect, whereas 
participants providing verbal responses exhibited a robust alternative-outcomes 
effect. Participants reported higher likelihoods when they read that Randy cleaned 
far more classrooms than anyone else (the latter of the two conditions described 
above). One question left unanswered by the above finding is whether the 
alternative-outcomes effect has any influence on judgments or decisions beyond a 
verbal uncertainty estimate. To address this issue (and to address the more 
general thesis of this work). Experiments 3 and 4 utilized various judgment and 
behavior-intention questions, as well as numeric and verbal uncertainty questions, 
as the dependent measures. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3, participants read a scenario that asked them to imagine 
attending a casino-style party held for charity. According to the scenario, you (the 
reader of the scenario) are holding 21 stubs for raffle tickets, and the night is 
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getting late. One scenario version indicated that other party guests hold 14, 13, 
15, 12, and 13 stubs each. Another scenario version indicated that other party 
guests hold 52, 6,2,2, and 5 stubs each. Whoever holds the stub to the ticket 
drawn in the big raffle wins $200. 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, there were three groups of participants. 
Participants in a control group answered a behavior intention question concerning 
how long they would be willing to wait at the party in order to be present for the 
raffle. They also were asked a judgment question about how optimistic they would 
be. Participants in the numeric-first group and verbal-first group provided 
numeric/verbal likelihood estimates before providing a behavior-intention response 
and optimism response. 
For the uncertainty measures, it was expected that a robust alternative-
outcomes effect would be detected for participants in the verbal-first group but not 
for participants in the numeric-first group. Concerning the direction of the effect, it 
was thought that people would feel a greater likelihood of winning the raffle when 
no one held more tickets than they did. Such a finding would be consistent with the 
results of the "Randy" scenario used by WindschitI and Wells (in press). The 
predictions for the judgment measures were similar. It seemed reasonable to 
expect that participants in the control conditions would want to wait longer and 
would be more optimistic when they held more tickets than anyone else versus 
when another person held many more tickets than they did. This data pattern 
would suggest that natural decision and judgment processes are sensitive to 
differences in the distributions of alternative outcomes, even when the distributions 
are normatively equivalent. The same data pattern was expected for participants in 
the verbal-first condition, who were not expected to engage in analytic or rule-
based processing in providing responses. However, for participants in the 
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numeric-first condition, it was expected that the numeric uncertainty measure would 
prompt analytic and rule-based processing. Consequently, responses for this 
condition would not show sensitivity to the manipulation of the distribution of 
alternative outcomes because the alternative distributions have normatively 
equivalent consequences for each participant's opportunity to win. 
Method 
Participants and Design. The participants were the 288 students who 
participated in Experiments 2 and 4 of this series (see the "Participants and 
Design" section of Experiment 2 for explanation of the counterbalancing and yoking 
of conditions). As was the case for Experiment 2, analyses indicated that the 
ordering of the experiments did not affect the results for this experiment. 
Consequently, the order-of-experiments variable (i.e., the counterbalancing) will not 
be discussed further. The design for this experiment was a 2 (Alternative-
Outcomes) X 3 (Control/Numeric-firstA/erbal-first) between-subjects factorial. 
Materials and Procedure. The procedures (the introductory instructions, the 
order in which different groups answered questions, etc.) resembled those of 
Experiment 2. Hence, the procedures will not be described again. The relevant 
scenario is printed below. Within brackets appear the two alternative-outcome 
distributions that were used. 
Imagine that you are attending a casino-style party being held for a local 
charity. The event organizers hid raffle-ticket stubs throughout the ballroom 
where the party is being held. Six party guests (yourself, Mary, Simon, 
Amman, Tara, and George) are eligible to search for the raffle tickets for a 
$200 money prize. All of the ticket stubs are found. [You found 21 of the 
tickets, Mary found 14, Simon found 13, Amman found 15, Tara found 12, 
and George found 13. / You found 21 of the tickets, Mary found 52, Simon 
found 6, Amman found 2, Tara found 2, and George found 5.] Whoever 
holds the stub for the ticket that is drawn will win the $200 prize. To win, you 
must be present at the event. 
The relevant behavior and judgment questions appeared as follows. 'You 
were planning to leave the party right at the time the raffle drawing was scheduled 
to be held. However, a party host announced that the drawing would be delayed 
for some time. How long would you be willing to wait at the party (which has now 
become quite boring for you) in order to be present for the drawing?" (10 minutes, 
20 minutes, 30 minutes, 40 minutes, 60 minutes, 90 minutes, 2 hours. 3 hours, >3 
hours). "How optimistic are you about winning the prize?" (not optimistic at all, 
barely optimistic, somewhat optimistic, pretty optimistic, very optimistic, extremely 
optimistic). The relevant uncertainty question appeared as follows: "How likely is it 
that you would win the prize?" 
Results and Discussion 
Is there an alternative-outcomes phenomenon? That is, do people's 
perceptions of the likelihood of a target outcome for an event vary as a function of 
how alternative outcomes for that event are distributed? The results of the present 
experiment suggest that the answer to this question is "Yes." As expected, 
however, the alternative outcomes effect appears to be difficult to capture with 
numeric measures of uncertainty. Responses for the uncertainty questions were 
scored as they were for Experiments 1 and 2. ANOVA results indicated that the 
main effect for the alternative outcomes manipulation was of borderline 
significance, F(1,188)=3.51, MSE=3.27. £=.06, d=.22, with participants providing 
higher likelihood estimates when they "held" more tickets than anyone else 
(M=4.70, SD=2.2). versus when another person held more tickets that they did 
(M=4.21, SD=2.2). When the alternative-outcomes effect is analyzed within the 
verbal-first group and numeric-first groups, it can be seen that the effect is reliable 
when verbal measures are used to assess uncertainty, t(94)=2.08, £<.05. d=.42, 
but the effect is weak and not significant when numeric measures are used. 
t(94)=0.53, 2=-60. The mean of the verbal estimates was 6.08 (near "slightly likely" 
on the scale; SD=1.5) for respondents who read that they held the most tickets, but 
it was only 5.29 (near "as likely as unlikely"; SD=2.1) for respondents who read that 
another person held more tickets. The respective means for the numeric estimates 
were 3.31 and 3.13 (near 30% on the scale; SDs=1.9 and 1.6).^ 
These results are consistent with findings from the "Randy" scenario of 
WindschitI and Wells (in press), for which an alternative-outcomes effect was 
detected when verbal measures were used to assess uncertainty but not when 
numeric measures were used. The results are also consistent with the idea that 
numeric measures of uncertainty might prompt people to engage in rule-based 
thinking and to provide uncertainty estimates that are relatively insensitive to some 
types of information (e.g.. nonnormative, experiential, associative information). In 
the present experiment, it appears that when people provided numeric estimates, 
they were generally cognizant of the fact that their likelihood of winning was 
determined by their share of tickets, 21, relative to the total number of tickets. 88. 
By objective standards, this gives them a 24% chance of winning regardless of 
which scenario they read. The uncertainty estimates of these participants seemed 
to be unaffected by how the 87 tickets that they did not hold were distributed. 
When people provided verbal estimates, however, their responses showed 
sensitivity to the normatively irrelevant distribution of the other 67 tickets. 
Interestingly, verbal estimates seem quite high relative to what more objective 
indicators of uncertainty would dictate. Seventy-six percent of participants in the 
verbal-first condition provided likelihood estimates of "as likely as is unlikely" or 
higher. As already mentioned, a main effect shift between verbal and numeric 
estimates, which was observed in the present experiment F(1.188)=89.40, 
MSE=3.27. E<.001, is common with these measures. 
A key question for the more general hypothesis of this dissertation concerns 
how the alternative-outcomes effect was exhibited in the optimism and time-spent-
waiting measures within the numeric-first, verbal-first, and control conditions. It 
was thought that the effect would be observed for both the verbal-first group and 
the control group, but that rule-based processing prompted by the numeric 
measure would wipe out the alternative-outcomes effect on the optimism and time 
questions for the numeric-first group. Contrary to this prediction, none of the 
groups exhibited an alternative-outcomes effect on the optimism and time 
questions. For analysis purposes, the time responses were scored from 1 (10 
minutes) to 9 (>3 hours), and the optimism responses were scored from 1 (not 
optimistic at all) to 6 (extremely optimistic). Overall, the time participants thought 
that they would wait was roughly equal for those who read that they held more 
tickets than anyone (M=4.61, SD=1.9) and those who read that someone else had 
more tickets (M=4.52, SD=1.9), F(1,282)<1. Also, participants who read that they 
held the most tickets expressed about the same amount of optimism (M=3.47, 
SD=0.9) as did those who read that someone else had more tickets (M=3.41, 
SD=0.9), F(1,282)<1. These two null effects were not moderated by a significant 
interaction with the estimate-type variable, both F's < 1, and there were no 
meaningful trends suggesting that an alternative-outcomes effect might differ in 
strength across the numeric-first, verbal-first, and control conditions. Hence, the 
results from the time and optimism questions do not provide the expected evidence 
for the prompting hypothesis outlined above. 
The fact that no alternative-outcomes effect was detected for the time and 
optimism questions in the verbal-first condition is particularly surprising. The 
surprise is due to the fact that participants' verbal estimates of uncertainty exhibited 
a reliable effect for the variations of how the alternative outcomes were distributed. 
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Why would the effect be apparent for participants' verbal estimates of uncertainty, 
but not for the same participants' time and optimism responses? A critic might 
suggest that verbal uncertainty estimates are relatively meaningless responses that 
are plagued by internal and between-subjects noise and are unfortunately sensitive 
to normatively and behaviorally irrelevant information. Thus, the critic would not 
expect the systematic differences on the verbal uncertainty measures to have 
consequences for the time and optimism responses. However, previous research 
has already shown that verbal estimates of uncertainty can be meaningful 
predictors of people's preferences and behavior intentions (WindschitI & Wells, in 
press). Also, Spearman-correlation analyses for the present experiment reveal that 
verbal estimates were no worse and no better at predicting time responses (r=.07) 
and optimism responses (r=.30) than were numeric estimates at predicting time 
(r=.00) and optimism responses (r=.28). 
Hence, if the links between verbal estimates and other responses are weak 
in the present experiment (which clearly they are, despite the fact that the two 
coefficients for the uncertainty/optimism relations are statistically significant), then 
an explanation for these weak links should focus on why psychological uncertainty 
was not a driving influence in participants' time and optimism judgments, rather 
than on why verbal estimates are not good indicators of psychological uncertainty. 
An additional analysis revealed that the relation between time and optimism 
responses was significant but modest (.35 for the total sample), which suggests 
that factors other than optimism likely had some influence over people's judgments 
of how much time they would spend at the party. In explaining the weak link 
between uncertainty or optimism responses and time responses, one could argue 
that there is great variability in the way participants perceive the utility of $200, the 
value of 90 minutes, and the boredom they would experience while waiting at the 
described party. The variability in these factors might overwhelm the influence of 
psychological uncertainty in determining the number of minutes participants 
indicate that they would wait at the described party. 
An unexpected but interesting trend in the optimism and time responses 
involved the main effects for the estimate-type variable. The main effect was 
significant for the optimism responses. F(2,282)=3.33, MSE=0.83. e<.05. Post hoc 
analyses revealed that the optimism responses of participants in the control group 
(M=3.64, SD=0.9) were significantly different from those of participants in the 
verbal-first group (M=3.33, SD=0.9) and numeric-first group (M=3.35, SD=0.9). 
ts(190)=2.34 and 2.18, respectively. The main effect for the time responses was 
not significant, F(2,282)=1.76, MSE=3.74. E=. 17, but the pattern of means across 
the control, verbal-first, and numeric-first groups was identical to the pattern found 
for optimism responses (Ms=4.85, 4.50, and 4.34, respectively; SDs=2.1. 1.8, and 
1.8). These findings suggest that asking participants to provide uncertainty 
estimates did have an effect on participants' subsequent judgments, but in a 
manner that was not expected. Rather than moderating an effect for the 
alternative-outcomes manipulation, asking participants to provide uncertainty 
estimates may have had a main-effect influence on people's other judgments, 
namely, causing people to feel less optimistic and to want to wait less time at the 
party. One possible explanation for this effect is that participants in the control 
condition felt quite good about their chances of winning in the scenario when they 
learned that they held 21 tickets (After all, how often does one hold 21 raffle 
tickets?), but the need to provide an uncertainty estimate prompted an awareness 
that the outcome was unpredictable (i.e., within a chance domain) and that even 
with 21 tickets, there was a good chance of not winning. Hence, one could argue 
that both numeric and verbal measures of uncertainty can change the way people 
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would normally think about uncertainty information in the absence of any 
uncertainty questions. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 was directly analogous to Experiment 3. It utilized the general 
framework of a cookie-jar scenario introduced by Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland 
(1989) in their demonstration of the ratio-bias phenomenon. !n the Miller at al. 
version and the present version, the scenario described a child who was allowed 
one cookie from the family cookie jar. And, as in the Miller et al. version, one of the 
main dependent measures was the reader's suspicion about whether the child 
disobeyed a family rule and peeked into the cookie jar to ensure grabbing a 
chocolate-chip cookie (the child's favorite), rather than a different flavor. The Miller 
et al. scenario contained a manipulation of the magnitude of numbers used to 
describe a chocolate-to-oatmeal-cookie ratio (1-in-19 versus 10-in-190). The 
present scenario contained a manipulation of the distribution of cookies that are not 
chocolate chip, in one version, participants read that there were two chocolate-
chip cookies along with one oatmeal, one raisin, one butterscotch, one rum, one 
peanut-butter, one pecan, and one sugar cookie. In another version, participants 
read that there were two chocolate-chip cookies along with seven oatmeal cookies. 
Similar to the predictions for Experiment 3, it was thought that people would 
perceive Katie's likelihood of picking her favorite type of cookie as higher when it 
was the most plentiful type in the cookie jar rather than when another type of cookie 
was the most plentiful. This effect was also expected to influence suspicion 
judgments in the control and verbal-first conditions, but not in the numeric-first 
conditions, because any rule-based thinking that might be prompted by the numeric 
uncertainty measures would yield similar reactions to the manipulated distributions 
of alternative cookies in the cookie jar. 
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Method 
Participants and Design. The participants were the 288 students who 
participated in Experiments 2 and 3 of this series (see the "Participants and 
Design" section of Experiment 2 for explanation of the counterbalancing and yoking 
of conditions). As was the case for Experiments 2 and 3, analyses indicated that 
the ordering of the experiments did not affect the results for this experiment. 
Consequently, the order-of-experiments variable (i.e., the counterbalancing) will not 
be discussed further. The design for this experiment was a 2 (Alternative-
Outcomes) X 3 (Control/Numeric-first/Verbal-first) between-subjects factorial. 
Materials and Procedure. The procedures resembled those of Experiments 
2 and 3. The relevant scenario is printed below. Within brackets appear the two 
alternative-outcome distributions that were used. 
Katie is a young girl who likes all kinds of cookies, but her strong favorite is 
chocolate chip. After dinner, she asks her dad if she can have a cookie for 
dessert. Her dad is agreeable, and Katie trots off to the cookie jar. The 
long-standing rule in Katie's home is that, when you are getting a cookie, 
you reach into the cookie jar without looking and take the first one that you 
grab. [The cookie jar that Katie is reaching into has 2 chocolate-chip 
cookies, along with 1 oatmeal, 1 raisin, 1 butterscotch. 1 rum, 1 peanut 
butter, 1 pecan, and 1 sugar cookie. / The cookie jar that Katie is reaching 
into has 2 chocolate-chip cookies and 7 oatmeal cookies.] Katie returns 
from the cookie jar eating a chocolate-chip cookie. 
The relevant judgment question appeared as follows: "How suspicious would 
you be that Katie did not follow the long-standing rule about picking a cookie 
without looking?" (not suspicious at all, a tiny bit suspicious, somewhat suspicious, 
fairly suspicious, pretty suspicious, very suspicious, extremely suspicious). The 
relevant uncertainty question appeared as follows. "Assuming that Katie followed 
the long-standing rule about picking a cookie without looking, how likely was it that 
Katie would happen to grab a chocolate-chip cookie?" 
Results and Discussion 
The results for this experiment were very similar to those for Experiment 3. 
The overall main effect for the alternative-outcomes effect on the uncertainty 
measure was significant. F(1.188)=7.84, MSE=2.00. e<.01. However, this main 
effect was moderated by the estimate-type variable in a significant interaction, 
F(1,188)=5.25, £<.05. The alternative-outcomes effect was quite strong when 
verbal measures were used to assess uncertainty, t(94)=3.16, e<.01 , d=.64, but the 
effect was weak and not significant when numeric measures were used, t{94)=0.43, 
e=.67, d=0.08. The mean of the verbal estimates was 4.17 (near "slightly unlikely" 
on the scale; SD=1.8) for respondents who read that chocolate-chip cookies were 
the most plentiful cookies in the cookie jar, but it was only 3.13 (near "fairly 
unlikely"; SD=1.5) for respondents who read that oatmeal cookies were the most 
plentiful. The respective means for the numeric estimates were 2.50 and 2.40 
(between 20% and 30% on the scale; ^s=1.6 and 0.6). These results provide 
additional evidence that the perceived likelihood of a target outcome can be 
affected by normatively equivalent variations in the distributions of alternative 
outcomes. As in Experiment 3, this alternative outcomes effect was only detected 
with verbal measures of uncertainty. 
Also similar to the results of Experiment 3, the judgment responses (about 
suspicion) made by participants in the control, verbal-first, and numeric-first groups 
did not show sensitivity to the alternative-outcomes effect. The suspicion 
responses were scored from 1 (not at all suspicious) to 7 (extremely suspicious) 
and were submitted to an ANOVA. The alternative-outcomes main effect was not 
significant, F(2,282)<1, nor were the means ordered in the predicted direction 
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(M=4.15, SD=1.3, for participants reading that oatmeal cookies were the most 
plentiful, M=4.23, SD=1.5, for participants reading that chocolate-chip cookies 
were the most plentiful). The null effect was not moderated by the estimate-type 
variable, F(2,282)=2.37. MSE=1.98. fi=.10. Also, the estimate-type main effect was 
not significant for the suspicion responses, F(2,282)=2.37, e=.10; the means for the 
control, verbal-first, and numeric-first groups were 4.30 (SD=1.5). 4.07 (SD=1.3). 
and 4.20 (SD=1.4), respectively. 
As was the case for Experiment 3, one can ask the question of why 
participants' verbal uncertainty responses exhibited an alternative-outcomes effect 
when the suspicion responses of the same participants did not. Low correlations 
between participants' uncertainty responses and their suspicion responses suggest 
that considerations other than the perceived likelihood of drawing a chocolate-chip 
cookie were driving participants' responses concerning suspicion. For participants 
in the numeric-first group the Spearman correlation was only -.10, and for 
participants in the verbal-first group the correlation was only -.06. 
Conclusions about the Influence of Alternative Outcomes 
The results of Experiments 3 and 4 provide strong evidence that the 
psychological uncertainty associated with a target outcome can vary as a function 
of normatively equivalent differences in how alternative outcomes are distributed. 
That is, when a target outcome has a normative probability of T. people's 
perceptions of the likelihood of the target outcome can vary depending on how the 
probability "space" for 1-T is distributed across alternative outcomes. One aspect 
of the present demonstrations that is particularly impressive is the fact that the 
objective probabilities of the target and alternative outcomes were precise and 
easily calculable for a respondent. There are many real world situations in which 
the power of an alternative-outcomes effect might be stronger than what was 
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observed in the present study because there are no clear-cut normative 
probabilities that can be associated with particular outcomes. 
Consider, for example, a physician who is diagnosing a condition of a 
particular patient and believes that the patient is likely to have Condition G. Later, 
the physician learns from other colleagues about 1) two alternative diagnoses, 
each having a moderate chance of being correct, or 2) numerous other diagnoses, 
each having a small chance of being correct. How would these differing inputs 
from colleagues affect the physician's uncertainty about the patient actually having 
Condition G? This hypothetical would be difficult to test in an experimental 
situation (due to an inability to equate and hold constant the probabilities of 
diagnoses^), but the present experiments and the "Randy" scenario discussed 
earlier (from Windschitl & Wells, in press) provide a foundation for making 
inferences about how the two inputs might differentially affect the physician's 
uncertainty. The present results suggest that Condition G would seem more 
probable given the latter input, for which there are several alternative diagnoses 
(each having a small likelihood of being correct and none being a strong competitor 
to Condition G). 
Another real-world situation in which the alternative-outcomes effect often 
might have critical implications involves the perceived likelihood that a particular 
criminal suspect is an actual culprit. An investigator's certainty that a particular 
suspect is guilty may be substantially influenced by variations in how many other 
people are considered as plausible suspects. Although it is often the case that 
considerations involving other suspects should influence the perceived likelihood 
that a particular suspect is guilty (see for relevant research Robinson & Hastie, 
1985; Robinson Van Wallendael, 1989; and Robinson Van Wallendael & Hastie, 
1990), the results presented here suggest that an investigator's certainty might 
sometimes be influenced by nomnatively irrelevant variations involving other 
suspects. For both the patient-diagnosis and suspect-investigation situations, the 
power of the alternative-outcomes effect might be substantial because, unlike the 
scenarios in the present experiments, there would be no objective probabilities 
available to anchor perceptions of the likelihoods of the target hypotheses. 
There are also plenty of real-world situations In which the alternative-
outcomes effects might be influential even when objective probabilities of the target 
outcomes can be known. For example, how would lottery-ticket purchasers in Iowa 
feel when they learn that ticket sales for a fixed-amount prize 1) are at an all-time 
high (1,000,000), thanks to a tremendous public participation, or 2) are at an all-
time high (1,000,000), thanks to one wealthy person who bought 600,000 tickets? 
The present findings suggest that the ticket holders would be less happy in the 
latter situation and perhaps perceive their ticket as less valuable in that situation. 
Future investigations involving the alternative-outcomes effect should 
involve the generation and testing of hypotheses to explain the processes driving 
the effect. A possible way of summarizing the direction of the alternative-outcomes 
effects found thus far is to say that a target outcome is perceived as more likely 
when there is no strong alternative outcome than when there is a strong alternative. 
One explanation for this type of finding involves a sort of imaging process in which 
people might mentally simulate or imagine the most likely outcome. People's 
ultimate perceptions of likelihood might be different when the mental simulation of 
the target outcome is quite easy given one particular distribution of alternative 
outcomes (e.g.. 2 chocolate-chip cookies and 1 of seven other types) but more 
difficult given another distribution (e.g., 2 chocolate-chip cookies and 7 oatmeal). 
If. for example, one of the alternative outcomes is quite salient, then the target 
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outcome may be difficult to imagine as the actual outcome and be perceived as 
unlikely to occur. 
A second explanation might involve people's awareness (albeit imperfect 
awareness) that the overall strength of alternative hypotheses about an outcome 
must be inversely related to the strength of the target hypothesis about the 
outcome. It may be that people are more likely to implement this understanding 
when there is a clear alternative hypothesis, rather than when they must aggregate 
a group of alternative hypotheses. When there is a strong alternative hypothesis, 
the mental aggregation of alternatives might not be required for the likelihood of the 
strong alternative to affect the perceived likelihood of the target outcome. If people 
tend not to fully aggregate alternative hypotheses, then the influence of alternative 
hypotheses might be small in situations in which there are numerous alternative 
outcomes and no strong rival to the target outcome. 
A third explanation suggests that subjective feelings of likelihood for a given 
outcome are always influenced by implicit comparisons with other meaningful 
outcomes. Research on social comparison processes indicates that people's 
perceptions of their own abilities, fortunes, and attitudes are affected by implicit 
comparisons with the abilities, fortunes, and attitudes of similar others (e.g., 
Festinger, 1954; Wood, 1989). Research on counterfactual thinking indicates that 
reactions (e.g., emotions) to an event's outcome can be affected by thoughts that 
compare what did happen to what could have happened (e.g., Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982; Roese & Olson, 1995). Given what is known about social 
comparison and counterfactual processing, it seems reasonable to suspect that 
perceptions of likelihoods are affected by comparisons. When a cookie jar 
contains two chocolate-chip cookies and one each of seven different types, one's 
chance of grabbing a chocolate-chip cookie is great, relative to one's chance of 
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grabbing a specified alternative. On the other hand, when a cookie jar contains two 
chocolate-chip cookies and seven oatmeal cookies, one's chance of grabbing a 
chocolate-chip cookie is terrible, relative to one's chance of grabbing the 
alternative flavor. Although such comparisons have no normative relevance for the 
question of "How likely is it that one would grab a chocolate-chip cookie?" they 
may, nevertheless, be responsible for systematic differences in people's responses 
on the verbal scales used in Experiments 3 and A? 
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THE INFLUENCE OF PERCEIVED CONTROL 
People often behave as though they have control over processes that are 
determined by chance mechanisms. For example, gamblers roll dice harder when 
they need a high number and softer when they need a low number (Henslin, 1967), 
and people will bet more money when they are allowed to roll a die for a 
predetermined number than when another person does the rolling (Koehler, Gibbs, 
& Hogarth, 1994). Do people really believe that such behaviors can help control or 
influence chance mechanisms? 
Langer (1975) has argued that people often hold an illusion of control-"an 
expectancy of personal success probability inappropriately higher than the 
objective probability would warrant" (p. 311). In a series of experiments, Langer 
observed people's behavior in chance situations that offered opportunities for the 
research participants to win money. The experimental findings seemed to indicate 
that various factors can enhance people's expectations of winning, even when 
those factors have zero bearing on the actual probabilities of winning. For 
example, people were more protective of a lottery ticket (i.e., they requested more 
money when asked to sell it) when they had personally chosen that ticket than 
when that ticket had been assigned to them. People were also less willing to trade 
their ticket when the ticket contained familiar information (letters of the alphabet) 
than when the ticket contained unfamiliar information (novel symbols). Since the 
time that Langer's work was introduced, the concept of an illusion of control has 
taken on a central role in much psychological theory and research. Numerous 
research studies have investigated who is most susceptible to the illusion, when 
people are most likely to manifest the illusion, and what consequences the illusion 
has (see e.g., Alloy & Clements, 1992; Dunn & Wilson, 1990; Flemming & Darley, 
1990; Friedland, Keinan, & Regev, 1992; Koehler et al., 1994). 
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In most of this research, the illusion of control is detected by using behavior 
measures or preference measures. For example, Friedland et al. (1992) 
investigated the illusion of control by observing people's preferences between 
tasks with control cues and tasks with no control cues. These types of measures 
have, for the most part, provided an adequate means of investigating the illusion of 
control. There is, however, at least one important question about the illusion of 
control that is difficult to address with behavior or preference measures. When 
using such measures, it is difficult to assess the "level" at which a particular 
instance of the illusion actually affects people's expectations of success. Does the 
illusion of control (or a particular instance of the illusion) actually affect people's 
well-thought-out beliefs about the likelihood of success, or does the illusion operate 
primarily on people's experiential feelings, hunches, and tendencies? In the 
language of Epstein's (1990) Cognitive Experiential Self Theory, does the illusion 
"hold up" under information processing in the rational system? Or is the illusion 
primarily a product of the experiential system? 
There is one research finding that could be interpreted as evidence that the 
illusion of control is less evident in situations requiring careful thought, than in 
situations not requiring careful thought. Dunn and Wilson (1990) conducted a 
study in which participants bet on a dice-rolling task that was either associated, or 
not associated, with control cues (the privilege to choose a die face and the 
privilege to roll). Under conditions in which the betting stakes were relatively low, 
participants exhibited an illusion of control (i.e., more money was bet when control 
cues were present). However, under conditions in which the betting stakes were 
high, participants did not exhibit an illusion of control. This finding might suggest 
that the illusion of control affects experiential processing, which is what guided 
behavior in the low-stakes condition, but not the more deliberate and careful 
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processing that was prompted by the serious consequences of the high-stakes 
condition. However, as pointed out by Dunn and Wilson themselves (1990), there 
are other explanations for the effects found in their study. They suggest, for 
example, an explanation involving mood states. This explanation does not involve 
an assumption that participants in the control-cue and high-stakes condition were 
realistic in perceiving their chances of winning: rather, the explanation suggests 
that those participants wanted to maintain a positive mood and feared betting too 
much. Hence, the Dunn and Wilson studies provide limited insight into whether 
control cues affect expectations of success when a person is engaged in careful 
and deliberate information processing. 
It is likely that verbal and numeric measures of uncertainty can provide a 
fruitful means of investigating the level at which control cues affect people's 
expectations of success. One would expect that the standard control cues used in 
prior research would affect people's verbal uncertainty estimates regarding the 
likelihood of their winning on a chance task. As hypothesized earlier, verbal 
measures assess people's experiential and associative thoughts about uncertainty. 
Because behavior is also generally guided by experiential and associative 
processing (Epstein, 1990), it seemed reasonable to expect that verbal measures 
would show illusion-of-control effects that are similar to those detected with most 
behavioral measures. Numeric measures, however, might not show such illusion-
of-control effects. Numeric measures might prompt people to think deliberately and 
analytically about the likelihood of their winning in a chance task, and such thinking 
could substantially diminish or wipe out an illusion-of-control effect. This would 
suggest that control cues can affect experientially driven thoughts and behavior, 
but that people, if prompted to think in a rule-based and deliberate fashion, will 
realize the invalidity of the illusion. Experiment 5 utilized verbal and numeric 
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measures of uncertainty to investigate the level at which the illusion of control can 
affect people's thoughts and expectations. 
In addition to investigating the level at which control cues affect uncertainty, 
Experiment 5 also explored the use of verbal uncertainty measures for assessing 
the illusion of control. By Langer's definition (1975), the illusion of control concerns 
people's expectations of success. Some studies have used confidence measures 
to assess people's expectation, but as mentioned above, most studies have utilized 
behavior and preference measures. Such measures require one to make 
inferences about people's perception of likelihood, and sometimes responses on 
behavior and preference measures are influenced by more than, or something 
other than, people's perceptions about the likelihood of their winning (see Bar-Hillel 
& Meter, 1996, for relevant discussion). It was thought that verbal measures of 
uncertainty might prove to be a direct and informative means of studying illusion-of-
control effects. 
Experiment 5 
In Experiment 5, two games of chance were used to investigate the illusion 
of control. Research participants played these games in a laboratory setting and 
wagered money on their outcomes. For one game, a simple die-rolling game, the 
objective odds of winning were relatively clear-cut. Participants had opportunities 
of winning money depending upon the outcomes of die rolls. For another game, 
involving a spinner partitioned into sections, the objective odds of winning were 
slightly ambiguous. Participants had opportunities of winning money depending 
upon whether a specified section of a spinner came to rest on the "pointer." 
Judging one's objective probability of winning in the spinner game required one to 
estimate the proportion of the spinner that was covered by the specified section. 
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For both types of games, a set of control cues was manipulated in a within-
subjects fashion. Participants were tested in groups of two. In each trial of a 
game, one participant was the "player" and one was the "observer." For the player, 
the control cues were strong; for the observer, the control cues were weak. In the 
spinner game, the players were given the "privilege" of choosing which of two 
equal-area sections would be his/her targets for winning, and he/she spun the 
spinner. By rule, the section not chosen by the player was assigned as the 
observer's target section. In the die-rolling game, the player was given the 
"privilege" of choosing which faces of the die were his/her targets, and he/she was 
allowed to roll the die. The player also specified which faces of the die were 
targets for the observer. 
In keeping with the designs of the previous four experiments, there were 
three groups of participants: a control group, a numeric-first group, and a verbal-
first group. Participants in the control group placed bets on all of the trials of the 
games without being asked anything about their uncertainty (and before the trials 
were played out). Participants in the numeric-first and verbal-first groups provided 
numeric/verbal uncertainty estimates for all of the trials, and then they placed bets 
for each of the trials (before any of the trials were played out). 
Given that the control-cues used in the present experiment were similar to 
those used in other illusion-of-control experiments, it was expected that people in 
the control and verbal-first groups would choose to bet more money when control-
cues were high rather than low. Such an effect would replicate the findings of 
previous experiments that used betting behavior as a dependent variable. It also 
was expected that the uncertainty estimates of participants in the verbal-first group 
would exhibit an illusion-of-control effect. For participants in the numeric-first 
group, however, it was thought that the need to provide the uncertainty responses 
64 
might prompt more analytic and rule-based processing that, in turn, would tend to 
damper the illusion-of-control effect for uncertainty and betting responses. It 
seemed reasonable to think the illusion-of-control effect, as detected by the 
uncertainty and betting measures in the numeric-first group, would be particularly 
weak for the die-rolling games. In these games, there was no ambiguity in a 
person's objective probability of winning. 
Method 
Participants and Design. The participants were the same 108 Iowa State 
University undergraduate students that participated in Experiment 1. As mentioned 
in the "Participants and Design" section for Experiment 1, analyses indicated that 
the ordering of the experiments did not affect the results for either of the 
experiments and, therefore, the counterbalancing of the two experiments will not be 
discussed further. The design was a 2 (Player/Observer) x 2 (Type of game) x 3 
(Control/Numeric-first/Verbal-first) mixed factorial. The player/observer and type-
of-game variables were manipulated within-subject. 
Procedure. Participants were tested in groups of two, and the experiment 
took place in a laboratory suite containing two cubicle rooms and a main room. 
When a participant arrived, the experimenter escorted him or her to a private 
cubicle and requested the participant's informed consent for an experiment that 
was said to involve betting on simple games. No one refused to participate. The 
experimenter then started him or her on a filler task (which, for half of the 
participants, was the questionnaire packet from Experiment 1). After both 
participants had arrived and completed the filler tasks, they were called into the 
main room and introduced to the experiment. The experimenter stated the 
following instructions; 
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As you read in the consent form, this experiment involves some simple 
games, and you are going to be allowed to bet on the outcomes of the 
games. I'm sure you already noticed that there are eight covered stations 
located around this room. At each station is a simple game that I will show 
you in just a few minutes. 
But first, I want to tell you a little bit about the betting. For each one of these 
games, you start with 25 points. After you are introduced to a game, I'm 
going to ask you to place a bet of anywhere from 0 to 25 points on a 
particular outcome. The payoff for a winning bet is three times the amount 
wagered. For example, if you decided to bet 10 points and you won the bet, 
then you would get 30 points plus you would keep the 15 points that you 
didn't bet. If you decided to bet 10 points but lost, then you would simply 
keep the 15 points that you didn't bet. 
Eventually we will play these games out, and we'll add up how many points 
you've got. Then, depending on how many points you have, we'll give you a 
certain amount of money. So, the more points that you have, the more 
money that you will receive. 
I want to make one thing clear; no matter how successful or unsuccessful 
you are in this experiment, you will not lose any money and you will always 
receive one point of extra credit. The average participant in this experiment 
makes about 2 or 3 dollars. 
The experimenter then explained that one participant would work the first 
four games and the other participant would work the last four games. The 
experimenter told the participants that the order was determined by alphabetical or 
reverse alphabetical order (what was said was randomly determined prior to the 
experiment). Each participant was then given a clipboard holding a "Betting On" 
sheet like the one shown in Figure 2. 
At this point, the first game (a spinner game) was uncovered and explained. 
As part of the explanation for the first spinner game, participants were told that the 
person working the game must spin the spinner hard enough so that it revolved at 
least three times before coming to rest. The experimenter instructed the 
participants that the player should pick which of two labeled sections of the spinner 
he/she would like to bet on and that, by rule, the observer must bet on the 
66 
Betting On: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Amount Wagered: 
(Max. X 2Spolms) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
How Likely Is it? 
How likely Is It that you will win? For each 
game, mark an "X" next to one option. 
Game #5 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
^60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 10% 
^0% 
Game #7 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
^20% 
10% 
0% 
Game #8 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 10% 
0% 
Figure 2. The "Betting On," "Amount Wagered," and "How Likely is it" response 
forms that were used in Experiment 5. For some participants, the "How Likely Is it" 
form contained verbal response scales. 
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unchosen section.® The participants were told to write down, on the "Betting On" 
sheet, which sections they were placing bets on. After they finished writing down 
their section labels, the experimenter uncovered the second game. Similar 
procedures were repeated for each of the eight games. For die-rolling games, the 
player was instructed to choose which faces of the die he/she wished to bet on and 
which faces the observer must bet on. After the "Betting On" sheets were 
completed, participants were told the following: 
In a few minutes, we will be playing out the games. Before we play each 
game, the person operating the game will be given two practice trials. For 
example, when we get to this game, you will get to spin the spinner two 
times before we actually play the game for real. 
At this point in the experiment, participants in the control group were given 
an "Amount Wagered" sheet (see Figure 2) that was added to the clipboard next to 
the "Betting On" sheet. They were instructed to privately indicate the number of 
points, from 0 to 25, that they wanted to wager for each game on the "Betting On" 
sheet. When each participant was finished, he/she was given a filler task to work 
on while waiting. Participants in the numeric-first croup were given a "How Likely 
Is It?" sheet (see Figure 2) that was added to the clipboard next to the "Betting On" 
sheet. The experimenter informed participants to privately indicate, for each game, 
how likely it was that they would win (or that their section or die faces would be 
winners). After the participants provided their responses on the numeric scales, 
the "How Likely Is It" sheets were taken and replaced by "Amount Wagered" 
sheets. The subsequent procedures were then identical to those described for the 
control group. Participants in the verbal-first croup experienced the same 
procedures as did the numeric-first group, with the exception that their responses 
on the "How Likely Is It?" sheet were made on verbal scales. 
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For all groups of participants, the games were played out after all of the bets 
were recorded. Participants were paid their due amounts and debriefed. 
The Games. The games listed below are numbered 1 to 8. In half of the 
experimental sessions, the games were shown and played in that order. In the 
other half of the experimental sessions, games 5-8 were played before games 1 -4 
(for counterbalancing purposes). Games 1, 2, 5, and 6 involved a flat, round 
spinner, which was 46 cm in diameter and fastened to a platform. An arrow, 
fastened to the platform and directed at the outer edge of the spinner, served as 
the pointer. Different spinner surfaces, which had different proportioned sections 
and different labels, could be fastened to the spinner platform. Hence, when Game 
1 was completed, the spinner surface could be replaced with a new surface for 
Game 2. Depictions of all of the spinner surfaces are shown in Figure 3. Games 3, 
4, 7, and 8 involved die rolling. In each game, the player rolled the die into the 
open end of a three-walled chamber made from an uncovered box (38 cm wide, 61 
cm deep, and 28 cm tall). 
The eight games can be described as follows. 1) Two sections of the 
spinner surface, each covering 29% of the spinner, were colored yellow. One of 
the yellow sections was labeled "Wind," and the other was labeled "Fire." The 
player was instructed to choose one of the two labeled sections. 2) Two sections 
of the spinner surface, each covering 34% of the spinner, were colored red. One of 
the red sections was labeled "Navy Blue," and the other was labeled "Canary 
Yellow." The player was instructed to choose one of the two labeled sections. 3) 
A 6-sided die was used in this game. The player was instructed to chose 2 sides 
as his/her targets and 2 other sides as targets for the observer. 4) A 12-sided die 
was used in this game. The player was instructed to choose 3 sides as his/her 
targets and 3 other sides as targets for the observer. 5) Two sections of the 
Figure 3. Depictions of the four spinner surfaces that were used in Experiment 5. 
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spinner surface, each covering 33% of the spinner, were colored orange. One of 
the orange sections was labeled "Sun," and the other was labeled "Moon." The 
player was instructed to choose one of the two labeled sections. 6) Two sections 
of the spinner surface, each covering 31 % of the spinner, were colored blue. One 
of the blue sections was labeled "New York," and the other was labeled 
"California." The player was instructed to choose one of the tv/o labeled sections. 
7) An 8-sided die was used in this game. The player was instructed to choose 3 
sides as his/her targets and 3 other sides as targets for the observer. 8) A 12-
sided die was used in this game. The player was instructed to choose 4 sides as 
his/her targets and 4 other sides as targets for the observer. 
Results and Discussion 
Each participant received four betting scores, a player score for the spinner 
games, a player score for the die games, an observer score for the spinner games, 
and an observer score for the die games. Each score was the mean of a 
participant's bets on the two relevant trials of a game. A mixed-factorial ANOVA 
was conducted for these betting scores, with the player/observer variable (i.e., the 
high-control-cue/low-control-cue variable) and the spinner/die variable as within-
subjects variables. An order-of-games variable was included in initial analyses, but 
did not interact with the relevant variables and will not be discussed further. 
The pattern of results for the betting scores was surprising. As expected, 
the overall effect for the player/observer variable was significant, F(1,93)=10.71, 
MSE=7.03. E<.01, with participants betting more points for games that they 
"controlled" than for the games that their co-participant "controlled." This effect 
was expected to interact with the estimate-type variable, with no illusion-of-control 
effect observed for participants in the numeric-first group. This interaction, 
however, was not significant, F(2.93)=1.77, MSE=7.03. b<.18, and the pattern of 
means did not resemble what was predicted. Rather, as can be seen in Figures 4 
and 5, the betting of participants In the control condition seemed to be uninfluenced 
by the player/observer manipulation, whereas the betting of participants in the 
numeric-first and verbal-first conditions did seem to be affected by the 
manipulation. Also evident from Figures 4 and 5 is that the findings for the betting 
measures were very similar for the spinner and dice games; although there was a 
main effect difference in betting between the spinner and dice games, 
F(1,93)=26.19, MSE=21.87. £<.001, the type-of-game variable did not significantly 
interact with the player/observer variable or the estimate-type variable, and the 
three-way interaction was also not significant (all F's < 1). The main effect for 
differences among the control, numeric-first, and verbal-first groups was also not 
significant, F(2,93)=1.70, MSE=86.33. e=.19. 
This pattern of results clearly does not conform to what was predicted. Not 
only was there no significant interaction between the player/observer and estimate-
types variables, but also the pattern of relevant means for this interaction is a 
puzzling one. It is unclear why the betting of participants in the control condition 
would not show sensitivity to the illusion-of-control effect. Several other studies, 
using betting or other behavior dependent measures, have demonstrated illusion-
of-control effects under conditions that were not dissimilar to those in the present 
study (Dunn & Wilson, 1990; Koehler, Gibbs, & Hogarth, 1994; Langer, 1975), and 
it is clear that the control-cues used In the present study were powerful, given that 
the overall main effect for the illusion of control was significant. From examining 
the present pattern of results in isolation, one might speculate that the illusion only 
occurs when the construct of uncertainty is made salient and that this occurs only 
in the numeric- and verbal-first conditions. This explanation, however, seems 
inadequate given that other demonstrations of the illusion-of-control effect have not 
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Figure 4. Number of points bet on the spinner games for participants in 
the numeric-first, verbal-first, and control groups as a function of high and 
low control cues. 
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Figure 5. Number of points bet on the die games for participants in the 
numeric-first, verbal-first, and control groups as a function of high and 
low control cues. 
72 
• Numerlc-Fffst 
1 Verbal-Rrst 
Control 
• 
I Numeric-First 
i Verbal-Rrst 
Control 
73 
involved uncertainty questions prior to the presentation of the main dependent 
measures. Given that the Player/Observer x Estimate-type interaction was not 
statistically significant, it seems premature to make any strong conclusions that 
assume that participants in a control condition would normally be unaffected by the 
same control cues that seem to have affected participants in the numeric-first and 
verbal-first conditions. It remains unclear whether additional power would reveal a 
statistically significant interaction effect, or whether the observed pattern is the 
result of chance variation. 
There was no indication that providing a numeric estimate of uncertainty 
moderated the illusion-of-control effect. Such a finding would have supported the 
hypothesis that numeric measures of uncertainty can prompt people to think in a 
more deliberate and rule-based manner than they normally would. The failure of 
numeric uncertainty measures to moderate the illusion-of-control effect could be 
explained in many ways. The most consequential, but not necessarily the most 
plausible, explanation is that the illusion of control affects not only people's 
experiential and associative thoughts about uncertainty, but also their deliberate 
and rule-based thoughts. This explanation would suggest that the control cues can 
affect people's careful and deliberate calculations of their chances of winning. This 
explanation is not supported, however, by the data from the numeric uncertainty 
measures, which did not show sensitivity to the control cues (and are discussed in 
more detail below). Another possible explanation for why providing a numeric 
uncertainty estimate did not moderate the illusion-of-control effect involves the 
idea that any rule-based and deliberate processing prompted by the numeric 
measures simply did not influence people's betting decisions. In other words, 
perhaps the numeric measures did prompt deliberate and rule-based processing. 
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but when people were making betting decisions, they nevertheless relied on 
associative and experiential processing. 
Like the results for the betting measures, the results for the uncertainty 
measures were surprising. Each participant received four uncertainty scores 
(analogous to the four betting scores described at the beginning of this section) 
that were means for the participant's uncertainty responses on the two relevant 
trials of the spinner and dice games. A mixed-factorial ANOVA was conducted for 
these scores. The overall effect for the player/observer variable was not 
significant, F(1,62)=1.34, MSE=0.70,2=-25; participants gave equivalent likelihood 
estimates for games that they "controlled" and games that their co-participant 
"controlled." This null effect held true regardless of whether the uncertainty 
estimates given by participants were numeric or verbal; the Player/Observer x 
Estimate-Type interaction was not significant, F(1,62)<1, and the pattern of means, 
seen in Figures 6 and 7, did not resemble what was predicted. Also evident from 
Figures 6 and 7 is that results for the uncertainty responses were very similar for 
the spinner and dice games. As was the case for the betting responses, there was 
a main-effect difference in uncertainty responses between the spinner and dice 
games, F(1,62)=10.39, MSE=1.87. E<.01, and the type-of-game variable did not 
interact significantly with the player/observer variable or the estimate-type variable, 
F(1,62)=1.56, MSE=0.33. £=.22, and F<1, respectively. The three-way interaction 
also was not significant, F(1,62)=2.14, MSE=0.33. e=.15. As is common with these 
uncertainty measures, there was a significant main-effect difference in uncertainty 
scores, F(1,62)=43.37. MSE=3.95. 2< 001. 
The null findings for the illusion-of-control effect on the uncertainty 
measures can be considered surprising in themselves, but they appear puzzling in 
light of the fact that the betting measures did detect an illusion-of-control effect. 
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Figure 6. Uncertainty responses on the spinner games for participants in 
the numeric-first and verbal-first groups as a function of high and low 
control cues. Responses for both the numeric and verbal scales were 
scored from 0 to 10. 
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Figure 7. Uncertainty responses on the die games for participants in the 
numeric-first and verbal-first groups as a function of high and low control 
cues. Responses for both the numeric and verbal scales were scored 
from 0 to 10. 
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One possible explanation for the finding assumes that both types of uncertainty 
questions, in combination with a within-subjects design, led participants to think in 
a somewhat careful and deliberate manner that had consequences for their 
uncertainty responses. Because participants knew that "control" over the games 
was manipulated, perhaps participants were cognizant that their uncertainty 
responses should not vary with the player/observer manipulation. Knowing how 
they responded for the games they controlled helped them provide appropriate 
responses for games they did not control, and vice versa. Knowing how to equate 
responses would be particularly helpful for participants providing verbal responses, 
since there are few objective benchmarks on a verbal scale (the endpoints and 
midpoint only). The overall mean for the verbal responses, which lies above "as 
likely as is unlikely" (M=5.57) suggests that participants did not look for normatively 
appropriate responses in an absolute sense, but they may have carefully equated 
their responses for the games for which they were the player and the games for 
which they were observer. Although this explanation seems plausible, it also must 
assume that participants' concerns for equating their uncertainty responses did not 
carry over into a concern for placing bets, because the betting measures did show 
an illusion-of-control effect. Perhaps participants went with their gut-level, 
experiential, and associative feelings when they had a chance to win money, but 
not when they were providing a researcher with data (i.e., answering likelihood 
questions). 
Correlational analyses were also conducted for Experiment 5, but these 
analyses do not clarify the surprising findings mentioned thus far. Spearman 
correlation coefficients were computed for the relations between uncertainty and 
betting responses for individual games. Table 1 displays the coefficients for each 
game. As can be seen from the table, coefficients for those providing verbal 
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Table 1 
Within-Game. Across-Participant Rank Correlations Between Uncertainty 
Responses (Numeric or Verbal) and Betting Responses. 
Type of Uncertainty Response 
Significant 
Game#/Type Numeric Verba! Difference? 
1 Spinner - .31 .13 No (p=.07) 
2 Spinner - .11 .10 No 
3 Die .26 .18 No 
4 Die .13 .26 No 
5 Spinner - .23 .11 No 
6 Spinner .18 .06 No 
7 Die .32 .23 No 
8 Die .06 .28 No 
Note. Each Spearman coefficient is based on a sample size of 36 participants. 
Entries in the last column were determined by conducting Fisher r-to-z 
transformations for the coefficients and then comparing verbal versus numeric 
coefficients with a z test statistic (alpha=.05, two-tailed). 
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estimates of uncertainty tend to be directionaliy higher than for those providing 
numeric estimates. The average of the eight coefficients from the number condition 
is only .04. whereas the average from the verbal condition is .17. 
Both of these average coefficients are surprisingly low. and they might, at 
first glance, seem to indicate that participants' betting behavior was not closely 
related to their feelings of uncertainty. However, across-game analyses indicate 
that participants' uncertainty was related to their betting behaviors. For the across-
game analyses, a correlation coefficient was computed for each participant based 
on the relation between his/her uncertainty and behavior responses. The average 
coefficients for participants in the numeric and verbal conditions were .48 and .47. 
respectively. The difference in the magnitude of the coefficients revealed by the 
within-game and across-game analyses suggests that there may have been a great 
deal of between-subjects variability in the way participants used the uncertainty 
scales, yet internal stability in how a given participant used the scale for his/her 
responding.9 Although between-subjects variability in people's use of uncertainty 
scales can be problematic in experiments utilizing between-subjects designs, the 
player/observer variable in the present experiment was manipulated within-subject. 
Given that the across-game correlational analyses reveal internal stability in 
participants' utilization of the uncertainty measures, one cannot simply assume that 
the null effect for the control-cues manipulation was due to variability in 
interpretation of the uncertainty responses. 
Conclusions about the Influence of Perceived Control 
The results from Experiment 5 replicate the common finding that illusory 
control cues can affect people's behavior under uncertainty (Henslin, 1967; 
Koehler, Gibbs, & Hogarth, 1994; Langer, 1975). An important question left 
unanswered from previous demonstrations of the illusion-of-control effect concerns 
the extent to which, or the level at which, control cues influence people's 
perceptions of uncertainty. As discussed earlier, Dunn and Wilson (1990) 
described an experiment in which participants' wagers were affected by control 
cues, but only under low-stakes conditions. A logical explanation for this result is 
that participants in the study were motivated to think deliberately and analytically 
when the stakes were high, and at that "level" of thinking, they knew that the 
control cues were not consequential for their chances of winning. Alternatives to 
this explanation are tenable, however, and these explanations do not assume that 
people were aware of the illusory nature of the control cues. 
Although it seems best to avoid making firm conclusions from Experiment 5 
about the level at which the control cues affect uncertainty, some aspects of the 
results suggest that the influence of control cues like the ones used here is limited. 
Previous experiments examining the illusion of control have not included direct 
measures of people's uncertainty (although some have used confidence 
measures). For most studies the main dependent variable is a behavior. The 
assumption made regarding the results from many of these studies is that control 
cues affect people's behavior because control cues affect people's uncertainty (see 
Langer, 1975). The uncertainty measures in the present experiment, however, 
showed no illusion-of-control effect. One possible explanation for this effect is that 
control cues do not influence people's uncertainty, but rather, they affect other 
variables, such as positive affect, that have consequences for people's behavior. 
Such an explanation is quite plausible when discussing between- subjects designs. 
However, when discussing instances in which a control-cue variable was 
manipulated in a within-subjects fashion, the explanation might be less plausible, 
although not untenable. 
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Perhaps a better explanation is that the control cues in the present study 
affected uncertainty at only an associative and experiential level. Although it was 
thought that verbal measures of uncertainty would not prompt more deliberate and 
rule-based thinking, there may have been aspects of the experiment that, in 
conjunction with the verbal (and numeric) uncertainty measures, prompted people 
to give responses based on somewhat deliberate processing (e.g., the laboratory 
setting, the within-subjects design, the fact that the eight uncertainty questions 
encountered by participants all appeared on one questionnaire page). The 
behavioral measures, which appeared as a betting game to the participants, may 
have allowed participants to settle into a more experiential and associative mode of 
thinking. It was on this measure that the illusion of control showed Its effects. Of 
course, acceptance of this explanation requires one to conclude that the deliberate 
and rule-based processing that yielded the uncertainty responses did not have the 
carry-over effects that were hypothesized in the introduction to this dissertation. 
That is, one must conclude that any prompting effects caused by uncertainty 
measures have consequences for only the uncertainty responses themselves and 
not for responses to subsequent questions or measures (see the next section for 
more discussion of this possible conclusion). 
Regardless of the fact that Experiment 5 did not produce evidence of a 
carry-over effect, it seems reasonable to suggest that the form of psychological 
uncertainty measured by the verbal and numeric measures in the experiment was 
not affected by the manipulated control cues. Although the control cues used in the 
present study and similar illusion-of-control studies may have an impact on 
people's uncertainty, this impact is likely limited to the more associative and 
experiential levels of thinking. Any measures or situations that might stimulate 
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more deliberate levels of reasoning will likely moderate what is known as the 
illusion-of-control effect. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Experiments 1-5 were designed to provide information about how people 
think about uncertainty. The main ideas driving these experiments were that for 
most everyday situations, people think about uncertainty in ways that are non-
numeric, associative, and experiential, and that measuring people's uncertainty by 
soliciting numeric estimates of uncertainty might prompt people to change the way 
that they would typically think about uncertainty. It was also thought that numeric 
measures of uncertainty might sometimes provide poor reflections of how various 
factors affect people's uncertainty. A general prediction made across these 
experiments was that, if numeric measures do in fact change the way in which 
people think about uncertainty, then soliciting numeric uncertainty estimates about 
a situation might have an impact on people's subsequent judgments, decisions, and 
behaviors regarding that situation. Verbal measures of uncertainty were tested as 
an alternative to numeric measures. They were thought to be less likely to prompt 
atypical processing and have little or no impact on people's subsequent judgments, 
decisions, and behaviors. Verbal measures were also used as a new tool to study 
how various factors affect people's uncertainty. 
None of the experiments yielded the predicted evidence for the prompting 
hypothesis. The judgments, decisions, and behaviors that were the main 
dependent measures in the present experiments were not affected by participants' 
prior exposure to numeric measures of uncertainty. These findings do not bode 
well for the idea that numeric measures prompt people to engage in deliberate and 
rule-based processing that can influence not just their uncertainty estimates 
concerning an event, but also other subsequent responses related to that event. 
Nevertheless, the present results do not preclude the idea that numeric measures 
prompt people to think in a deliberate and rule-based manner, but only for 
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purposes of providing their numeric uncertainty responses. Hence, a simple form 
of the prompting hypothesis (i.e., that responses on numeric uncertainty measures 
are products of deliberate and rule-based processing, but this processing does not 
necessarily affect other subsequent responses) might remain the best explanation 
for why verbal measures can sometimes have an advantage over numeric 
measures for detecting subtle differences in psychological uncertainty and for 
predicting people judgments, decisions, and behaviors (WindschitI & Well, in 
press). 
Recall that the main alternative to the prompting hypothesis is the 
conversion-noise hypothesis, which suggests that both verbal and numeric 
uncertainty responses require translations from the internal construct of 
psychological uncertainty, and that the translation to numeric expressions involves 
more random noise than does a translation to verbal expressions. Two 
observations related to the present experiments are inconsistent with the 
conversion-noise hypothesis. First, the advantage of verbal measures for detecting 
subtle differences in psychological uncertainty and for predicting decisions, 
judgments, and behaviors appears to be situation specific. For example, in the 
alternative-outcomes experiments (#3 and #4), verbal measures were more 
effective than numeric measures for detecting differences in psychological 
uncertainty, but in the perceived-control experiment (#5), both verbal and numeric 
measures showed equivalent levels of insensitivity to the control-cues manipulation 
(even though the behavior measures suggested that the manipulation did affect the 
psychological uncertainty mediating people's betting behavior). Also, in 
Experiment 3 of WindschitI and Wells (in press), there was great variability across 
scenarios in the size of the advantage observed for verbal measures in predicting 
behavioral intentions. The noise hypothesis cannot readily explain the 
inconsistency with which verbal measures out-perform numeric measures. If verbal 
responses are more useful simply because there is less random noise when 
generating verbal (versus numeric) responses from an internal representation of 
uncertainty, then one would not expect the advantage of verbal measures to be tied 
to specific situations and scenarios. The prompting hypothesis, on the other hand, 
leads one to expect systematic variability in the instances in which verbal measures 
out-perform numeric measures. For example, the prompting hypothesis suggests 
that the advantage of verbal measures will be greatest when a predicted response 
is based on experiential and associative thinking. However, when a predicted 
response is influenced by deliberate and rule-based considerations, numeric 
measures might out-predict verbal measures. 
A second observation that is incompatible with the conversion-noise 
hypothesis involves the main-effect difference in verbal and numeric estimates 
provided in response to low-probability events. Recall that for the five experiments 
reported here, both verbal and numeric uncertainty responses were scored from 0 
to 10. Although there is no direct mapping among responses on the two scales, the 
selection of verbal scale options was guided by data from translation studies in 
which participants provided numeric translations of verbal expressions (see 
WindschitI and Wells, in press, for more information). Hence, if a given scenario 
elicits a mean response of 30% (scored as a 3) on a numeric scale, one would 
expect that the scenario would illicit a mean verbal response of "fairly unlikely" 
(which is scored as a 3 for the present experiments and had a mean translation 
response of 27.9% in a previous study). This type of matching pattern, however, is 
the exception, rather than the norm. In all five experiments reported here, there 
was a substantial upward shift in verbal scores relative to numeric scores. More 
interesting is the fact that the magnitude of this upward shift differs between 
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experiments. For example, the mean numeric uncertainty scores were nearly 
identical for Experiments 2 and 3 (Ms=3.27 and 3.22, respectively), but the mean 
verbal uncertainty score for Experiment 2 (M=4.12) was quite different from the 
mean verbal uncertainty score for Experiment 3 (M=5.69). 
The noise hypothesis would have difficulty accounting for the consistent 
main effect differences between the verbal and numeric scores, and it clearly 
cannot account for the interactions in means among experiments. However, from 
the perspective of the prompting hypothesis, the main-effect shifts are consistent 
with speculation that even improbable events can seem quite possible in an 
associative and experiential mode of thinking (WindschitI & Wells, in press). The 
interactions occur because the experiential uncertainty associated with two events 
can differ, even though normative levels of uncertainty do not differ in regards to 
the two events. Consider, for example, the differences in events described in 
Experiments 2 and 3. The uncertainty question in Experiment 2 asked respondents 
about the likelihood of having a problematic enzyme, whereas the uncertainty 
question in Experiment 3 concerned the likelihood of being the winner of a $200 
prize. 
If the prompting hypothesis is to be considered the best explanation for the 
advantages shown by verbal measures, how can the results of the present 
experiments be explained? At least two explanations can be considered. First, it is 
possible that numeric measures of uncertainty do prompt an atypical form of 
processing, but that this type of processing can be short lived. When people are 
asked to make a decision or engage in a behavior, their responses are not 
influenced by processing that was prompted by previous uncertainty questions. 
Rather, their responses are based on the more associative and experiential 
processing that is the default form of processing for such decisions and behaviors. 
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This type of explanation seems especially appropriate for Experiment 5 in which 
participants' betting behavior showed sensitivity to control cues even though their 
responses on previous uncertainty questions did not. 
Although Feldman and Lynch (1988) argued that some survey items can 
cause normally automatic behavior to come under conscious control, it is unclear 
what specific qualities of a survey question can lead to such an effect. One 
example offered by Feldman and Lynch is the finding that stating one's intentions 
to perform a given behavior will increase one's likelihood of subsequently engaging 
in that behavior (Sherman, 1980). The link between the two measures in the 
Sherman study is obvious and quite strong. Perhaps if the links between the 
uncertainty questions and the subsequent measures were stronger in the present 
experiments, the predicted carry-over effect would have been observed. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear that such carry-over effects-between closely linked 
measures-would be particularly supportive of the prompting hypothesis that was 
investigated here. The prompting hypothesis stated that numeric uncertainty 
questions might cause a substantial change in the way people processed 
uncertainty information, not just prompt concerns over response consistency, which 
is what might explain the effects in studies using closely linked measures (such as 
Sherman's, 1980). 
Although the idea that the mode of processing prompted by numeric 
measures might be short lived can explain the results from Experiment 5, the idea 
seems less helpful in explaining the results of Experiments 1, 3 and 4. For these 
three experiments, it was thought that deliberate and rule-based processing (but 
not associative and experiential processing) would lead to "discoveries" about the 
uncertainty information that would have a lasting effect on respondents' 
interpretations and decisions about that situation. For Experiment 1, the 
solicitation of numeric uncertainty responses was expected to prompt people to 
discover the relevance of base-rate information for diagnosing Edwin's condition. 
For Experiment 3, the solicitation of numeric responses was expected to force 
people to discover that they held only 24% of the raffle tickets, even when they 
were holding more tickets than anyone else. Hence, one might look to Experiment 
1, 3, and 4 for the clearest evidence about the prompting hypothesis. However, 
problems that are not necessarily related to the prompting hypothesis itself make it 
difficult to draw conclusions from the experiments. In Experiments 3 and 4, the 
dependent measures that are key in assessing the prompting hypotheses seemed 
to be weakly related to participants' uncertainty, and so the null effects for 
participants in the control condition (and the other conditions) may have been 
driven by factors other than psychological uncertainty. In Experiment 1, it seems 
as though most participants were aware of the relevance of base-rate information; 
either rule-based thinking was not required to discover the relevance of base-rate 
information, or participants from all groups were thinking in a rule-based manner. 
This leads to a second possible explanation for the absence of the expected 
evidence for the prompting hypothesis. 
The second explanation seems most relevant for the first two experiments. It 
assumes that the judgment and decision measures themselves prompted 
respondents to think in a relatively deliberate and rule-based manner. This 
explanation is fueled by the findings that the treatment decisions of participants in 
the control condition of Experiment 1 may have been unexpectedly sensitive to 
base-rate information, and that the interest and surprise judgments of participants 
in Experiment 2 were not sensitive to the representativeness manipulation. 
Sensitivity to base-rate information was thought to be a characteristic of only rule-
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based reasoning, and the manipulation used in Experiment 2 was designed to 
affect people's associative, but not deliberate, thoughts about uncertainty. 
It is difficult to judge the veracity of this second explanation without further 
experimentation. In future experiments similar to Experiment 2 of the present 
series, it may be wise to manipulate both the representativeness information as 
well as the base-rate information (orthogonally or at once). For example, some 
participants could be told that 3 in 13 Americans have the critical enzyme and 
others could be told that 6 in 13 have the enzyme. The interaction of this 
manipulation with the original representativeness manipulation would likely prove 
more informative about the extent to which participants in a control condition (and 
numeric-first and verbal-first conditions) are utilizing the two types of information. 
Concerning a future experiment similar to Experiment 1, it seems probable that 
small modifications to the scenario should yield results, for a control condition, that 
are more in line with the classic base-rate neglect findings that are common in 
studies of this type. For example, the frequentist representation of the base-rate 
information could be abandoned. Perhaps with a classic base-rate-neglect effect 
observed in a control condition, the results from a numeric-first and verbal-first 
condition would be more informative. 
Although the results of the presented experiments provide limited 
information about the prompting hypothesis, they do provide an additional and 
important reason for continued optimism concerning the use of verbal measures in 
studying psychological uncertainty. Experiments 3 and 4 illustrate how verbal 
measures of uncertainty can be used to make new discoveries about how people 
think about uncertainty. The results from the verbal-first conditions of those 
experiments suggest that the perceived likelihood of a target outcome can be 
affected by how alternatives to that outcome are distributed. This alternative-
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outcomes effect has implications in a variety of real-world settings. The way in 
which doctors think about a particular disease, or detectives think about a 
particular suspect, or theorists think about a particular theory might be influenced 
by normatively equivalent distributions of other possible diseases, suspects, and 
theories. The alternative-outcomes effect is difficult to research with numeric 
measures of uncertainty, and researchers' reliance on numeric measures may have 
slowed the discovery of this phenomenon. There is good reason to think that 
verbal measures of uncertainty, or other alternative measures, can be helpful in 
making additional discoveries about psychological uncertainty. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 
Mean Verbal and Numeric Uncertainty Responses for the AAL and APh Illnesses 
From Experiment 1. 
Numeric Verbal 
Disease Type M (SD) M (SD) 
AAL 3.86 (2.9) 5.77 (2.3) 
APh 453 (2.6) 6.44 (1.8) 
Note. Each mean is based on a sample size of 36. 
Table A2 
Mean Uncertainty Responses bv Estimate Type and Representativeness Level in 
Experiment 2. 
Numeric Verbal 
Representativeness M (SD) M (SD) 
Low 2.85 (2.0) 3.83 (2.1) 
High 3.69 (2.5) 4.41 (2.3) 
Note. Each mean is based on a sample size of 48. 
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Table A3 
Mean Interest Responses bv Estimate Type and Representativeness Level in 
Experiment 2. 
Numeric-First Verbal-First Control 
Representativeness M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low 3.17 (1.2) 3.50 (1.5) 3.77 (1.2) 
High 3.58 (1.2) 3.65 (1.4) 3.63 (1.3) 
Note. Each mean is based on a sample size of 48. 
Table A4 
Mean Surprise Responses bv Estimate Type and Representativeness Level in 
Experiment 2. 
Numeric-First Verbal-First Control 
Representativeness M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low 4.17 (1.1) 3.65 (1.1) 3.75 (1.1) 
High 3.69 (1.3) 3.72 (1.3) 3.33 (1.4) 
Note. Each mean is based on a sample size of 48. 
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Table A5 
Mean Uncertainty Responses bv Estimate Type and Ticket Distribution in 
Experiment 3. 
Numeric Verbal 
Ticket Distribution M (SD) M (SD) 
21.14,13,15,12,13 3.31 (1.9)  6.08 (1.5)  
21,52,6,2,2,5 3.13 (1.6)  5.29 (2.1)  
Note. Each mean is based on a sample size of 48. 
Table A6 
Mean Responses for the Time Question by Estimate Type and Ticket Distribution in 
Experiment 3. 
Numeric-First Verbal-First Control 
Ticket Distribution M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
21,14,13,15,12,13 4.48 (1.9)  4.52 (1.7)  4.83 (2.3)  
21,52,6,2,2,5 4.21 (1.7)  4.48 (2.0)  4.88 (2.0)  
Note. Each mean is based on a sample size of 48. 
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Table A7 
Mean Optimism Responses bv Estimate Type and Ticket Distribution in 
Experiment 3. 
Numeric-First Verbal-First Control 
Ticket Distribution M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
21,14,13,15,12.13 3.38 (0.9)  3.40 (0.9)  3.65 (0.9)  
21,52,6,2,2,5 3.33 (0.9)  3.27 (1.0)  3.63 (0.8)  
Note. Each mean is based on a sample size of 48. 
Table A8 
Mean Uncertainty Responses by Estimate Type and Cookie Distribution in 
Experiment 4. 
Numeric Verbal 
Cookie Distribution M (SD) M (SD) 
2,1,1.1,1,1,1,1 2.50 (1.6) 4.17 (1.8) 
2,7 2.40 (0.6) 3.13 (1.5) 
Note. Each mean is based on a sample size of 48. 
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Table A9 
Mean Suspicion Responses bv Estimate Type and Cookie Distribution in 
Experiment 4. 
Numeric-First Verbal-First Control 
Cookie Distribution M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
2.1,1,1,1,1.1.1 4.00 (1.7) 4.31 (1.4) 4.38 (1.5) 
2.7 4.40 (1.1) 3.83 (1.2) 4.23 (1.4) 
Note. Each mean is based on a sample size of 48. 
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Notes 
1 Throughout this dissertation, the numeric-first/verbal-first/control 
manipulation will often be referred to as the estimate-type manipulation or estimate-
type variable. Note that this label will be used when discussing analyses of the 
uncertainty responses, even though participants in the control conditions are not 
included in such analyses. 
2 Some readers may be concerned about the potential problems associated 
with using difference scores as inputs in inferential statistics. Other correlational 
analyses between treatment decisions and uncertainty responses (including partial-
correlation analyses) led to the same conclusion-that there was no difference 
between groups in the strength of the relations between uncertainty and treatment 
responses. 
3 The ANOVAs mentioned here were also conducted on a particular subset 
of individuals. Recall that the scenario mentioned that the enzyme was most 
prevalent in "Europeans and Americans whose ancestors are of European 
descent." At the end of the scenario packet, participants answered the following 
question: "One of the scenarios that you read mentioned that the TES enzyme was 
prevalent in Europeans and Americans whose ancestors were of European 
descent. Would you classify yourself as fitting that category?" The second set of 
ANOVAs were conducted on only those individuals who answered "yes" to this 
question. Those ANOVAs yielded a pattern of results that would lead to 
conclusions that are identical to those based on the entire same of participants. 
4 A "don't know" response was also an option. 
5 Although the degree of interaction between estimate-type and version of 
scenario did not reach statistical significance, F(1,188)=1.34, MSE=3.27. £=.25, 
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a-priori considerations justify making simple-effect comparisons between scenario 
versions and within the numeric and verbal response groups. 
6 Also, It would be difficult to control for normatively appropriate 
considerations involved in adjusting the perceived likelihood of a target hypothesis 
when the strengths of the alternatives to the target hypothesis increase or 
decrease. 
7 Klein & Weinstein (in press) discussed interesting examples of how 
comparative risk information (e.g., being told that one is 20% more or less likely 
than the average person to cause an accident) can do more to shape a person's 
responses on a "How safe are you?" scale than does absolute risk information 
(e.g.,. being told that your driving habits give you a 30% or 60% chance of causing 
an accident). Perhaps verbal measures of uncertainty, like the self-report safety 
scale but unlike numeric measures of uncertainty, are sensitive to the effects of 
comparative information. 
8 Participants were never actually addressed as "player" and "observer." 
9 This conclusion, however, is tenuous, given that one could also assume 
that the between-subjects variability rests in how participants reacted to the betting 
measure (see Bryant & Norman, 1980; Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Sutherland et 
al., 1991 for a further discussion of the variability issue). 
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